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ABSTRACT 
 
 
BONG-KEUN JEONG. An assessment of consumer piracy risk and optimal supply 
chain coordination strategies. (Under the direction of DR. MOUTAZ KHOUJA) 
 
 
Digital piracy and the emergence of new distribution channels have changed the 
dynamics of supply chain coordination and created many interesting problems. There 
has been increased attention to understanding the phenomenon of consumer piracy 
behavior and its impact on supply chain profitability. The purpose of this dissertation is 
to better understand the impact of digital piracy on online music channel and optimal 
supply chain strategies which achieve high levels of coordination. A multi-method 
approach including survey, mathematical modeling, and simulation are used to a) 
analyze the impact of piracy on digital music channel coordination under different 
contract arrangements, b) develop theoretical and operational basis for conceptualizing 
a measurement model of consumer piracy risk, c) examine the effectiveness of piracy 
control strategies used to dissuade consumers from illegal music downloads. Findings 
from this dissertation contribute to the literature on digital piracy, consumer piracy 
behavior, online channel distribution, and supply chain coordination, and provide 
several important managerial implications. 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I would like to express the deepest gratitude to my mentors for their directions 
and insights. First, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Moutaz Khouja for 
his support and guidance. His instructive comments and evaluations at every stage of 
the dissertation process helped me to complete the projects on schedule and 
substantially to improve the quality of work. Also, I would like to thank all my 
dissertation committee members, respectively, Dr. Ram Kumar, Dr. SungJune Park, 
Dr. Kexin Zhao, and Dr. Robert Roundtree for their insights, support, and guidance.  
 I also would like to thank my family and friends for their love and support. I 
would never have been able to survive this long journey without their help. Very 
special thanks to HJ for our friendship, love, and happy memories. Finally, this 
dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my beloved brother in heaven. May his soul 
rest in peace. 
   
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 2:  THE IMPACT OF PIRACY AND SUPPLY CHAIN  
                         CONTRACTS ON DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL  
                         COORDINATION 
6 
  2.1  Introduction 6 
  2.2  Literature Review 10 
  2.3  A Digital Music Supply Chain Model 18 
  2.4  Comparison of Different Scenarios 26 
  2.5  Analysis 35 
  2.6  Discussion and Conclusion 47 
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF  
                        CONSUMER PIRACY RISK IN THE CONTEXT OF ILLEGAL  
                        MUSIC DOWNLOADS 
51 
  3.1  Introduction 51 
3.2  Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding Consumer Piracy Risk 52 
  3.3  A Theoretical Domain of Consumer Piracy Risk 54 
  3.4  Research Methodology 67 
  3.5  Data Analyses and Results 73 
  3.6  Discussion and Conclusion 83 
CHAPTER 4: EFFECTIVE PIRACY CONTROL STRATEGIES: AN AGENT 
                       BASED MODELING APPROACH 
86 
  4.1  Introduction 86 
vi 
 
  4.2  Theoretical Background 87 
  4.3 Agent-based Modeling and Optimal Piracy Control Strategies 93 
  4.4 Analyses and Results 102 
  4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 115 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 118 
  5.1  Research Overview 118 
  5.2  Discussion of Findings and Contribution 119 
  5.3  Future Research 121 
REFERENCES 123 
APPENDIX A: PROOFS 132 
APPENDIX B: NETLOGO CODE FOR THE SIMULATION MODEL 140 
APPENDIX C: FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE NETLOGO MODEL 146 
APPENDIX D: SNAPSHOT OF THE NETLOGO MODEL 147 
 
  
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1: Sales figures for the music industry 14 
TABLE 2: Selected literature in the area of piracy and supply chain coordination 17 
TABLE 3: Notation 21 
TABLE 4: Different scenarios 26 
TABLE 5: Summary of centralized chain optimums 28 
TABLE 6: Summary of decentralized supply chain optimums with per song  
                  contract 
30 
TABLE 7: Summary of fixed fee full transfer contract optimums 32 
TABLE 8: Summary of fixed fee partial transfer contract optimums 35 
TABLE 9: Different parameter settings 46 
TABLE 10: Consumer piracy risk dimensions 62 
TABLE 11: Numerical example of consumer piracy risk and the number of  
                    contents pirated 
64 
TABLE 12: Scenarios and construct measurement 69 
TABLE 13: Demographic information on subjects 72 
TABLE 14: Results of principal component factor analysis 74 
TABLE 15: Assessment of internal consistency  76 
TABLE 16: Pair-wise correlations: Assessment of discriminant validity  76 
TABLE 17: Cross-loading: Assessment of convergent and discriminant validity 77 
TABLE 18: PLS path weight 78 
TABLE 19: Differences in the path weight estimates 79 
TABLE 20: Group differences in two scenarios 81 
viii 
 
TABLE 21: Group differences in gender 82 
TABLE 22: Group differences in file sharing experience 82 
TABLE 23: Group differences in age 82 
TABLE 24: Group differences in file sharing experience in years 83 
TABLE 25: Parameters for the experiment 102 
TABLE 26: Effectiveness of law-suit investments 103 
TABLE 27: Effectiveness of educational campaign investments 103 
TABLE 28: Optimal solution for combined piracy control strategies 114 
TABLE 29: Comparison of profit difference between combined value-added  
                    services and combined low-price strategy 
115 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Research streams in the area of digital piracy 2 
FIGURE 2: Consumer's valuation for songs in an album 19 
FIGURE 3: Total chain profits vs. piracy cost for the per song contract 37 
FIGURE 4: Total chain profits vs. 1  and 0  38 
FIGURE 5: Profits vs. piracy cost under linear and fixed risk cost for the per  
                    song contract 
39 
FIGURE 6: Profit distribution vs. piracy cost for the per song contract 40 
FIGURE 7: Profits vs. 0  under fixed piracy risk cost 42 
FIGURE 8: Profitable values of 2  and 0  under fixed piracy risk cost 42 
FIGURE 9: Fixed fee advantage vs. 2  and M  44 
FIGURE 10: Fixed fee advantage vs. rc  and lc  45 
FIGURE 11: Profit distribution vs. piracy cost under the per song contract 47 
FIGURE 12: Consumer piracy risk construct 68 
FIGURE 13: Consumer’s valuation for songs 96 
FIGURE 14: Impact of piracy control strategies on consumers’ piracy risk 99 
FIGURE 15: The impact of legal and educational campaigns on record label’s  
                      profit 
104 
FIGURE 16: The relationship between the number of law-suits and educational  
                      campaigns and consumer piracy behaviors 
105 
FIGURE 17: The relationship between effectiveness of legal and educational  
                      campaign and record label’s profit 
107 
FIGURE 18: The relationship between value-added services and low-price  
                      strategy and record label’s profit 
108 
x 
 
FIGURE 19: The effects of different piracy control strategies on consumer  
                      behavior 
109 
FIGURE 20: The effects of combined piracy control strategies on record label’s  
                      profit 
111 
FIGURE 21: The relationship between effectiveness of legal and educational  
                      campaign with value-added services and record label’s profit 
112 
FIGURE 22: The effects of combined piracy control strategies on record label’s  
                      profit 
113 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The ability to digitize information goods such as software, music and movies 
and the growing accessibility of the Internet has created unique opportunities and 
threats for the digital good industries. Recent advances in digital and file compression 
technologies have transformed the way digital products are created and distributed. For 
example, in the music industry, online distribution channels have proliferated in recent 
years. Songs can be transmitted via the Internet in digitized form so that consumers can 
conveniently choose to download a single song, an entire album, or a customized 
bundle from websites such as iTunes and Rhapsody. While current online music sales 
account for only 15% of total sales (IFPI 2008), online sales are increasing rapidly. 
At the same time, the prevalence of unauthorized copying and dissemination 
has been a serious threat in the digital experience goods industries. In the music 
industry, for example, the rapid developments of compression and file-sharing 
technologies as well as the decreasing cost of copying mediums have provided 
consumers with greater access to free music than ever before. A report from the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) shows that unit sales of CD 
albums declined by 27.5% from 2005 to 2007 while digital album unit sales increased 
by 212.5%. Similarly, unit sales of single song CDs declined by 7.1% while digital 
single song unit sales increased by 121% (RIAA 2008). Although numerous piracy 
control strategies have been implemented, it is likely that piracy will remain a serious 
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problem in the future.  
Digital piracy and the emergence of new distribution channels have changed the 
dynamics of supply chain coordination and created some interesting problems. There 
has been increased attention to understanding the phenomenon of consumer piracy 
behavior and its impact on supply chain profitability. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
research in this area has focused on several topics such as pricing decision, artist 
royalty, contract, government subsidiary, piracy control strategy, and more. 
 
Figure 1: Research streams in the area of digital piracy 
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the impact of digital 
piracy on online music channel and optimal supply chain strategies which achieve high 
levels of coordination. Using multiple approaches including survey, mathematical 
modeling, and simulation, this dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we 
develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the impact of piracy on digital music 
channel coordination under different contract arrangements. To better understand the 
implications of piracy on digital music sales, we define two types of consumer piracy 
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risk cost: 1) linear piracy cost and 2) fixed piracy cost. In the linear cost case, we 
assume that a consumer's piracy risk cost increases linearly as the number of songs 
pirated increases. In the fixed cost case, the risk cost a consumer attaches to piracy is 
independent of the number of songs pirated. The piracy act may involve a single song 
or a full album, but once the consumer violates the law, a fixed risk cost is assigned to 
the act. 
We also analyze two contract types between a record label and an online 
retailer: 1) fixed fee contract and 2) per song contract. In the fixed fee contract, the 
record label charges the retailer a fixed fee for an entire album of songs regardless of 
the number of times songs are downloaded from the retailer's website. In the per song 
contract, which is the most common contract type in the music industry, the record 
label charges the retailer a certain wholesale price for each song downloaded. For each 
case, we identify an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium and analyze how different piracy 
risk costs and contract types affect supply chain pricing, record label and retailer's 
profits, and supply chain coordination. 
In chapter 3, we develop a theoretical and operational basis for conceptualizing 
a measurement model of consumer piracy risk using an empirical survey. Previous 
research in this area has focused on the influence of social, economic, and behavioral 
factors on the intention to pirate digital products. Although many theoretical models 
have been proposed to understand consumers’ ethical decision-making process in the 
context of piracy, there have been little research undertaken to formally assess risks 
involved in consumer piracy behavior. Few studies have examined how the risks may 
affect consumer piracy decision, but, no attempts have yet been made to identify 
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components of consumer piracy risk when they illegally download contents, and to 
what extent different risk components contribute to an overall piracy risk.  
To address these shortcomings, we identify fundamental determinants of 
consumer piracy risk and empirically test the relative importance of risk dimensions in 
the context of illegal music downloads. In addition to examining the components of 
consumer piracy risk, we also explore how consumers assess their piracy risk with 
respect to the amount of content they pirate. For instance, if a consumer perceives a 
high probability of prosecution, she is more likely to perceive higher risk as the number 
of songs she pirates increases. On the other hand, some consumers may be conscious 
about their image, or they may have a desire to be identified with certain social group. 
In such a case, the pirating behavior can be perceived as being unethical regardless of 
how many songs they pirate. Many piracy acts may involve pirating more than one 
song, but it is unclear whether consumer piracy risk is increasing in the content pirated 
or fixed. Therefore, we investigate the relationship between the amount of content 
pirated and each dimension of piracy risk as well as the overall risk. This empirical 
study would help us to better understand consumers’ piracy risk assessment and to 
enable us to develop more realistic analytical and simulation models. 
Chapter 4 provides an alternative methodology to evaluate a relationship among 
players in the digital supply chain. In particular, we analyze the effectiveness of piracy 
control strategies used to dissuade consumers from illegal music downloads. Record 
labels, often working with the government, have employed a number of anti-piracy 
strategies to protect intellectual property and increase the demand for legitimate 
products. However, the overall effectiveness of the music industry’s efforts to curtail 
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online piracy is still questionable. Also, understanding the effectiveness of piracy 
control strategies on consumer behavior is a complex problem which is difficult to 
analyze. If the relationships in the model are simple enough, it is possible to use the 
mathematical modeling techniques to obtain insights into the problem. However, many 
real-world problems are too complex to allow realistic models to be evaluated 
analytically (Law and Kelton 2000). 
We use an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach to analyze the effectiveness 
of various piracy control strategies. The use of ABM enables us to analyze agents’ 
behavior, motives, and interactions and examine their consequences in terms of 
aggregate system behavior. Based on the literature review, we identify four strategies 
to combat digital piracy: low-price, educational, legal, and value-added service strategy. 
Using the agent-based modeling approach, we 1) provide an alternative methodology 
for analyzing the piracy control strategies, 2) find good piracy control strategies in a 
market where some piracy is unavoidable, and 3) investigate the impact of piracy on 
consumers, retailers, record labels, and artists.  
Finally, chapter 5 concludes with an overview of dissertation, summary of 
findings and contribution, and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF PIRACY AND SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS ON 
DIGITAL MUSIC CHANNEL COORDINATION 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Advances in the Internet and file compression technologies have transformed 
the way digital products, such as software, movies, and music, are created and 
distributed. For example, in the music industry, online distribution channels have 
proliferated in recent years. Songs can be transmitted via the Internet in digitized form 
so that consumers can conveniently choose to download a single song, an entire album, 
or a customized bundle from websites such as iTunes and Rhapsody. While current 
online music sales account for only 15% of total sales (IFPI 2008), online sales are 
increasing rapidly. A report from the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) shows that unit sales of CD albums declined by 27.5% from 2005 to 2007 
while digital album unit sales increased by 212.5%. Similarly, unit sales of single song 
CDs declined by 7.1% while digital single song unit sales increased by 121% (RIAA 
2008). 
As online distribution channels become more popular, there is an increasing 
need to re-examine contracts and coordination issues in digital music supply chains. 
For instance, an important question we should ask is how do existing business models, 
pricing schemes, and licensing structures need to be adjusted in order to reflect the 
changes caused by moving from brick-and-mortar retailing to online digital sales. 
Traditional coordination strategies in physical product supply chains such as buy-back 
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and return policies may not be applicable due to the unique characteristics of digital 
experience goods (Chellappa and Shivendu 2005). Marginal production cost, 
packaging cost, and a portion of distribution cost can be eliminated by selling these 
products through an online digital channel. Furthermore, digital products do not require 
inventory, which eliminates the risk of obsolescence and perishability (Shapiro and 
Varian 1999). However, digital products are vulnerable to piracy. 
The prevalence of unauthorized copying and dissemination has been a serious 
threat in the digital experience goods industries. In the music industry, rapid 
development of compression and file-sharing technologies as well as decreasing cost of 
copying mediums have provided consumers with greater access to free music than ever 
before. Although technological preventive controls using software and hardware have 
been implemented, they have often had limited success, and imposed unfair restrictions 
on what legitimate consumers can do with the songs they have bought (Stone 2009). 
Also, despite the clear articulation of digital copyright law and legal as well as 
educational deterrence efforts, piracy still exists due to the high cost of increasing 
consumers' awareness and of enforcing the law. Thus, it is likely that piracy will 
remain as a serious problem well into the future. 
In this paper, we develop a model to analyze the impact of piracy on digital 
music supply chain profitability under different contract arrangements between record 
labels and online retailers. We focus on profit maximization for newly released music 
albums. A number of studies have examined how perceived risk affects consumer 
decision and behavior (Gopal and Sanders 1997, Peace, et al. 2003). These studies have 
identified various aspect of risk, such as financial, performance, social, and prosecution 
8 
 
risk, involved in ethical decision making (Tan 2002). However, it is unclear how 
consumers assess their piracy risk cost with respect to the amount of content they pirate. 
For example, if a consumer perceives a high probability of prosecution, she is more 
likely to perceive higher risk as the number of songs she pirates increases. On the other 
hand, some consumers may be conscious about their image, or they may have a desire 
to be identified with certain social group. In such a case, pirating behavior can be 
perceived as being unethical regardless of how many songs a consumer pirates. To 
better understand the implications of piracy on digital music sales, we first define two 
types of consumer piracy risk cost: 1) linear piracy cost and 2) fixed piracy cost. In the 
linear cost case, we assume that a consumer's piracy risk cost increases linearly as the 
number of songs pirated increases. In the fixed cost case, the risk cost a consumer 
attaches to piracy is independent of the number of songs pirated. The piracy act may 
involve a single song or a full album, but once the consumer violates the law, a fixed 
risk cost is assigned to the act. 
In addition to different types of piracy risk cost, we also examine contractual 
arrangements between a record label and an online retailer. We consider two contract 
types: 1) fixed fee contract and 2) per song contract. In the fixed fee contract, the 
record label charges the retailer a fixed fee for an entire album of songs regardless of 
the number of times songs are downloaded from the retailer's website. In the per song 
contract, which is the most common contract type in the music industry, the record 
label charges the retailer a certain wholesale price for each song downloaded. For each 
case, we identify an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium and analyze how different piracy 
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risk costs and contract types affect supply chain pricing, record label and retailer's 
profits, and supply chain coordination. Analytical results show that: 
 The amount of supply chain profit loss due to piracy depends on the type of piracy 
risk cost of consumers as well as the contract type between the record label and the 
retailer 
 Changes in consumers' piracy risk cost not only alter total supply chain profit but 
also change the distribution of the profit between the record label and the online 
retailer 
 Piracy has larger negative impact on the profitability of music albums containing a 
large number of popular songs 
 The fixed fee full transfer contract will always fully coordinate the supply chain, and 
 The profitability of the fixed fee contract further increases as online market size 
increases, consumer piracy risk cost increases, and marginal cost decreases 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents relevant 
literature in the area of piracy and supply chain coordination. Section 2.3 provides an 
overview of the model in which we describe consumer purchase behavior, consumers' 
piracy risk costs, and contract types between the record label and the online retailer. 
Section 2.4 derives the optimal prices and supply chain profits in the presence of 
different piracy risk costs as well as under different contract types. Section 2.5 presents 
a number of findings and demonstrates the robustness of our results using a numerical 
experiment. Section 2.6 contains managerial implications, conclusions, and directions 
for future research. 
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
We review relevant literature in two research streams. First, we discuss the impact of 
piracy on digital experience goods, including approaches to modeling consumer piracy 
behavior. Then, we briefly review the literature on supply chain coordination strategies. 
A large body of research has explored the impact of piracy on digital 
experience goods industries, especially in the software industry. Hong (Hong 2007) 
analyzed data on Internet growth and consumer expenditure on entertainment, which 
included expenditure on recorded music. Based on 1996-2002 data, the author found 
that Internet growth had a significant negative effect on recorded music sales, which 
the author in part contributed to the negative effect in the form of file sharing. 
However, other studies have shown that the negative impact of piracy on the legitimate 
demand is considerably smaller than industry estimates (Hui and Png 2003), and 
tolerating some piracy might even be beneficial when it creates positive network 
externality, that is, the potential legitimate purchase might increase as more people 
pirate and experience a product (Conner and Rumelt 1991, Givon, et al. 1995, 
Nascimento and Vanhonacker 1988, Takeyama 1994). 
To better understand the impact of digital piracy, a careful analysis of consumer 
piracy behavior is needed. Previous studies incorporated various economic and 
behavioral factors such as penalties and ethical propensities that influence consumers' 
piracy tendency. Chen and Png (Chen and Png 1999) developed a model that 
incorporates a penalty for copyright violation set by the government. In the model, 
consumers are segmented into ethical and unethical groups. While ethical consumers 
can choose either buying a legitimate product or not using it, unethical consumers 
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maximize their net benefits by choosing among buying the legitimate product, not 
using it, and pirating. In the case of pirating the product, consumers will be detected 
with certain probability and must pay a penalty cost. The results show that changes in 
pricing and monitoring rates have qualitatively different effects on consumers and that 
from a social welfare perspective, reductions in price are better than increases in 
monitoring. Similar market segmentation was used by Khouja and Park (Khouja and 
Park 2007) in a model that considered a heterogeneous consumer market with three 
segments: ethical, indifferent, and pirating with each having a different affinity to 
piracy. While the indifferent segment has the penalty for the wrongness of piracy 
(moral cost) as well as the penalty cost, the pirating segment only incurs the penalty 
cost. The model focuses on retailer's pricing policies of digital experience goods under 
piracy. The results indicate that the explicit incorporation of different consumer 
segments will cause the retailer to charge lower prices and, therefore, lead to higher 
legal product diffusion. The authors also show that the royalty system does not solve 
the double marginalization problem and is suboptimal from a supply chain perspective. 
Chellappa and Shivendu (Chellappa and Shivendu 2005) developed a model for 
motion picture DVDs. The authors analyzed the implications of maintaining different 
technology standards in DVD players on the global pricing and piracy. The model 
considers two distinct types of piracy: 1) global where consumers obtain illegal copies 
for a region other than their own and 2) regional where consumers pirate products 
meant for their own region. Consumers differ among regions with some regions having 
consumers with higher marginal willingness to pay for the product (Region A) 
compared to other regions with lower consumer income (Region B). The authors 
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assume that the moral cost as well as the penalty cost in Region A is greater than 
Region B due to greater intellectual property right protection efforts. The results 
indicate that when piracy is prevalent, losses from global piracy can be higher than 
when there is only regional piracy. Thus, maintaining separate technology standards is 
critical to minimize the loss. Sundararajan (Sundararjan 2004) analyzed the optimal 
pricing and technological protection levels for a monopolist using price discrimination 
among consumers. The author shows that the optimal pricing schedule can be 
characterized as a combination of a zero-piracy pricing schedule and a piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule. In the absence of price discrimination, an optimal 
protection level is at the technologically maximum level, while it is always at a lower 
level in the case when a seller can price discriminate. 
An interesting finding by Gopal and Sanders (Gopal and Sanders 1997) is that 
deterrent controls that employ educational and legal campaigns to dissuade pirates 
provide more profits to the publisher than preventive controls that use technology to 
make piracy costly and difficult. Also, deterrent controls are shown to be superior with 
respect to a social welfare. Bhattacharjee et al. (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006b) modeled a 
consumer search process and retailer strategies in the presence of online piracy. In their 
study, different pricing options, including per unit, subscription, and mixed pricing, 
and different licensing structures, including lump sum, percentage, and per download 
payment, were considered. The result indicates that the mixed pricing strategy 
dominates the other two options, and the lump sum and percentage revenue are the 
better licensing structures than the per download cost structure. However, reactions of 
other important players in the chain such as the manufacture were not considered. Chen 
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and Png (Chen and Png 2003) extended their earlier model (Chen and Png 1999) to 
include a tax on copying media and equipment and a government subsidy for legitimate 
purchases in addition to the penalty for copying. They focused on effective government 
actions that protect social welfare by incorporating different government policies 
against piracy, producer's business strategies, and users' choices. The results indicate 
that taxing the copying media is superior to imposing a penalty for piracy, and that 
subsidizing legitimate purchases is the optimal government policy from social welfare 
perspective. 
In sum, consumer ethical attitude and perceived risk have been widely used in 
the literature as a key factor to model consumer piracy behavior. However, prior 
studies (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006b, Chen and Png 1999, Chen and Png 2003, Gopal 
and Sanders 1997, Khouja and Park 2007, Sundararjan 2004) mainly dealt with the 
piracy of a single product (e.g. a consumer incurs a certain penalty cost if they are 
caught pirating a song), and did not examine what happens if piracy risk cost increases 
as the amount of content pirated increases. Since many piracy acts may involve pirating 
more than one product, it is questionable whether piracy risk cost increases linearly in 
content pirated. The implications of the risk cost structures where more than one song 
is pirated in a single act may have profound impact on profitability. To better 
understand the effect of piracy, we compare the fixed piracy risk cost case with the 
linearly increasing case. Given the large volume of music files available online and the 
option to pirate multiple songs in each piracy session, our approach can provide new 
insight into the impact of piracy on the digital music market.  
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The Internet has brought renewed research interest in supply chain 
management. Much of this research has focused on physical products supply chains. A 
good deal of this research has found that the Internet has increased the power of 
manufacturers due to making it possible for them to bypass retailers and sell directly to 
consumers (Chiang, et al. 2003, Tsay and Agrawal 2004). In these e-commerce models, 
the physical product is unchanged but the manufacturer ships it directly to the 
consumer. While the Internet has given increased power to the manufacturers of 
physical products, it has had an opposite effect in experience goods industries. In the 
music industry, for example, the power once held by the record labels is undergoing a 
profound shift due to advances in the technology needed to produce and distribute 
experience goods. As described by Clemons et al (Clemons, et al. 2002), the forces 
which made “stars” in the industry captive to record labels in spite of receiving only 
10-15% of unit price in royalties are weakening. 
Table 1: Sales figures for the music industry 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% 
change 
(05-
06) 
% 
change 
(06-
07) 
% 
change 
(05-
07) 
% 
change 
(04-07) 
Album 
downloaded 
(millions of 
units) 
4.6 13.6 27.6 42.5 103% 54% 213% 824% 
Album 
downloaded 
(millions of 
dollars) 
45.5 135.7 275.9 424.9 103% 54% 213% 834% 
Single 
downloaded 
(millions of 
units) 
139.4 366.9 586.4 809.9 60% 38% 121% 481% 
Single 
downloaded 
(millions of 
dollars) 
138.0 363.3 580.6 801.8 60% 38% 121% 481% 
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Table 1 (continued) 
CD sales 
(millions of 
units) 
767.0 705.4 619.7 511.1 -12% -18% -28% -33% 
CD sales 
(millions of 
dollars) 
11446 10520 9372 7452 -11% -20% -29% -35% 
CD Single 
(millions of 
units) 
3.1 2.8 1.7 2.6 -39% 53% -7% -16% 
CD Single 
(millions of 
dollars) 
15.0 10.9 7.7 12.2 -29% 58% 12% -19% 
 
Digital experience goods and recorded music in particular may be distributed 
through one of several channels. Premkumar (Premkumar 2003) outlined six 
distribution strategies in the music industry, record label-retailer-customer, record 
label-customer, record label-intermediary-customer, artist-customer, artist-
intermediary-customer, and audio-on-demand. While the traditional supply chain 
configuration of record label-retailer-customer (RLRC) channel remains the most 
common way of distributing music, the record label-intermediary-customer (RLIC) 
channel is gaining in popularity. In this channel, consumers buy songs in digital format 
from an intermediary such as iTunes or Rhapsody who pay the record label for the 
songs. Table 1 shows that the number of singles sold digitally on the Internet using the 
RLIC channel exceeds the number sold on the RLRC channel (RIAA 2008). Also, the 
average growth/decline rates over 2005-2007 show that sales of CD albums on the 
RLIC channel will well exceed the sales on the RLRC channel by 2012. 
Supply chain coordination for physical products, including experience goods, 
have been extensively studied in the area of operations management and economics. 
Cachon and Lariviere (Cachon and Lariviere 2005) showed that revenue-sharing 
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arrangements coordinate the supply chain in the video rental industry and maximize 
overall supply chain profit. They compared revenue sharing with buy-back, quantity-
flexibility, price discount, and sales rebate contracts. The authors found that revenue 
sharing is superior in its ability to coordinate many types of supply chains. Revenue 
sharing encourages retailers to have higher order quantities which tend to increase the 
overall revenue of the whole supply chain. Chellappa and Shivendu (Chellappa and 
Shivendu 2003b, Chellappa and Shivendu 2007) examined the impact of piracy on 
digital products supply chains under different contracts. They found that, in the 
absence of piracy, both manufactures and retailers are indifferent between payment 
policies (a fixed one-time payment vs. a per-copy payment) since their profits are the 
same. However, in the presence of piracy, due to high fixed infrastructure cost, zero 
marginal cost, and uncertainty in market size, retailers prefer fixed-fee contract where 
they pay one time licensing fee. They also demonstrated that the piracy and the prices 
are lower in the fixe-fee contract regime.  
Chellappa and Shivendu (Chellappa and Shivendu 2003b, Chellappa and 
Shivendu 2007) studies are the first to examine digital supply chain coordination under 
piracy; however, our study is different in several ways. First, the studies were limited 
to homogenous consumer segment in their taste and risk cost. Their focus was on 
purchasing/pirating a single product, consequently, the studies did not consider the 
relationship between consumers’ piracy risk and the amount of content pirated. As we 
mentioned earlier, piracy may involve pirating more than one song in a single piracy 
session, but it is not clear how consumers assess their piracy risk with respect to the 
amount of content they pirate. It is important to understand how consumer piracy risk 
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changes with respect to the amount of content since it will influence their 
purchase/piracy behavior. In this regard, we consider two different types of consumer 
piracy risk costs; linear risk cost and fixed risk cost. Second, they assume that the 
quality of digital product would increase as the number of features increases. However, 
prior studies show that consumers perceive compressed music quality as almost the 
same or very good compared to legitimate CD quality (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2003). 
Therefore, we assume consumers view a pirated copy as a perfect substitute for a 
legitimate copy and thus get the same utility from the pirated copy.  
In sum, we focus on two contract arrangements between the record label and 
the online retailer: a fixed fee contract and a per song (wholesale price) contract 
currently used in the music industry. In addition, we incorporate heterogeneity in the 
consumers’ behaviors with regard to valuation for products and piracy risk cost. A 
comparison of different contract types and their interaction with different piracy risk 
costs can provide better insights into digital music supply chain coordination strategies 
and their implications. Table 2 provides the main aspects of models most closely 
related to our framework. 
Table 2: Selected literature in the area of piracy and supply chain coordination 
 Players in supply chain 
Consumer 
piracy 
behavior 
Research Study 
C
o
n
su
m
er 
R
etailer 
M
an
u
factu
rer 
C
reato
r 
G
o
v
ern
m
en
t 
H
o
m
o
g
en
eo
u
s 
H
etero
g
en
eo
u
s 
Gopal and Sanders (1997) ⅹ  ⅹ   ⅹ  
Hui and Png (2003) ⅹ  ⅹ   ⅹ  
Chen and Png (2003) ⅹ  ⅹ  ⅹ  ⅹ 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Sundararajan (2004) ⅹ ⅹ    ⅹ  
Chellappa and Shivendu (2003, 
2005, 2007) 
ⅹ ⅹ ⅹ   ⅹ  
Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) ⅹ ⅹ    ⅹ  
Khouja and Park (2007) ⅹ ⅹ  ⅹ   ⅹ 
Khouja and Wang (2010) ⅹ ⅹ ⅹ ⅹ  ⅹ  
Our Study ⅹ ⅹ ⅹ    ⅹ 
 
2.3 A DIGITAL MUSIC SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL 
We first examine consumers' purchase behavior. We assume that, for a newly 
released album, a consumer's valuation for songs is a non-decreasing concave function 
in the number of songs purchased, indicating that the marginal valuation is diminishing 
in the number of songs purchased from the album. This is a reasonable assumption 
because consumers can buy their favorite songs first when using online stores. 
Consumer i's valuation for μ songs is given by: 
 


 000
0
if,=
<if,
=




ii
i
i
yV
y
V
 (1)
 
 where  
 i  = 1, 2,  , M , a consumer index, 
y  = a random variable satisfying 11   y  and 0, 11  . y  has a known 
probability density function, pdf, )(yfY  and cumulative density function, cdf, 
)(yFY , 
 i
y  = random variable y  associated with consumer i , 
   = a constant satisfying 10  , and 
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0  = the number of songs at which a consumer's marginal valuation becomes 
zero. 
 i
y  is a parameter indicating the scale of the utility function and   is a constant 
describing the shape of the utility function. The consumer valuation function above 
implies that consumers have different valuations for songs and these valuations 
diminish at the same rate. Assume, iF  has a finite mean and an inverse 
1
iF . Define 
)(1=)(  ii FF . In our model, consumers are uniformly distributed with respect to y . 
The number of songs that a consumer purchases must satisfy 0   since the marginal 
utility becomes zero beyond 0 . We assume  that 0  
is same for all consumers to 
maintain analytical tractability while allowing different consumers to prefer different 
songs. For any given price per song, consumers will purchase the number of songs that 
maximize their net gains. Figure 2 shows different consumer valuation functions with 
respect to   and y . In practice, a consumer buys an integer number of songs, but the 
use of a continuous   allows us to better analyze the problem. 
 
Figure 2: Consumer's valuation for songs in an album, 0 = 8 
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Proposition 1 The optimal number of songs consumer i purchases is  
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Proof. See Appendix 1  
 The left hand side of equation (2) is the consumer's marginal cost of purchasing 
an extra song, while the right hand side is the marginal valuation that an average 
consumer gains from purchasing one additional song. The consumer will purchase the 
number of songs where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal valuation. The 
optimal expected number of songs a consumer buys is:  
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(= , the optimal expected number of songs a consumer 
buys becomes (given that the upper limit is 0 )  
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 (3) 
2.3.1 Impact of Piracy on Consumer Purchase Behavior 
 Consumers can obtain a song by purchasing a legitimate copy or by pirating it. 
While consumers can get songs for free (or at a negligible cost) if they pirate, they are 
subject to piracy costs caused by potential penalties for violating copyright if they are 
caught, and a search cost to identify and download pirated copies. In this paper, we 
consider two different types of piracy risk costs: linear cost and fixed cost, which we 
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will explain in detail in the following subsections. We use G  to represent the 
probability that a consumer will purchase a legitimate copy. G  is determined by 
comparing the net gain from purchasing legitimate songs and pirating them. For the no 
piracy case, NG  = 1 because, according to our utility function, all consumers will 
purchase some quantity of songs in the absence of piracy, albeit the quantity purchased 
may be very small. Table 3 explains the notations used in this paper. 
Table  3: Notation 
j
sqwp ,),,,(    
p : retail price, w : wholesale price,  : number of songs,  : profit 
j : piracy risk cost (N = no piracy, L = linear piracy cost, F = fixed piracy cost) 
q : type of contract (PS = per song contract, FC = fixed fee contract, FF = fixed fee  
     contract with full transfer, FP = fixed fee contract with partial transfer) 
s : player (CC = centralized chain, RE = retailer, RL = record label, TC = total  
     chain) 
 
2.3.1.1 Linear Piracy Risk Cost 
 In the linear piracy risk cost case, the risk cost consumer i  attaches to piracy 
increases linearly in the number of songs pirated. Prior studies suggest that consumers 
perceive compressed music quality as almost the same or very good compared to 
legitimate CD quality (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2003). Therefore, we assume consumers 
view a pirated copy as a perfect substitute for a legitimate copy and thus get the same 
utility from the pirated copy. In this scenario, consumer i  will purchase   songs if the 
gain from purchasing them is larger than the gain from pirating, i.e., 
 Liii zypy 
   
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For analytical convenience, we assume that consumer i 's piracy risk cost, Liz , is 
uniformly distributed between 2  and 2 . Then, the probability that consumer i  will 
purchase a legitimate product is  
 
,0)(=,0)
1
)
1
(1(= 2
11222
1
1 




p
maxdydtmaxG
p
L 

 
 (4)
 
  where 22=    
We expect the price ( p ) to be greater than the lower bound on the piracy cost ( )2 . 
However, in the case of 2p , the above equation becomes  
 
,0),1)((= 2

 p
maxminG L

 (5)
 
2.3.1.2 Fixed Piracy Risk Cost 
 In the fixed piracy risk cost case, the risk cost consumer i  attaches to piracy is 
independent of the number of songs pirated. In other words, once a consumer violates 
copyright law, she perceives the penalty to be Fiz , which is also uniformly distributed 
between 2  and 2 . The piracy act may be pirating a single song or a full album, but 
the risk cost is only associated with the act. The rational for this case lies in the 
expectation that the largest piracy risk cost occurs in pirating the first song and the 
marginal cost of pirating more songs diminishes very quickly after that. The extreme 
case occurs when the whole piracy risk cost is perceived by the consumer to occur in 
pirating the first song.  
 In this case, the risk cost of pirating 0  songs is the same as pirating just one 
song. Therefore, if consumer i  chooses to pirate, she will maximizes her gain by 
illegally downloading all 0  songs, at which the consumer's marginal valuation for 
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songs becomes zero. Therefore, consumer i  compares the net gain from purchasing 
any number of songs to the net gain from pirating 0  songs, and purchases if  
 Fiii zypy 
  0  
The probability that consumer i  will purchase   songs is  
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2.3.2 Contract between the Record Label and the Online Retailer 
 In this subsection, we explore different types of contracts between the record 
label and the online retailer.  We consider two common contract schemes: a per song 
contract (PS) and a fixed fee contract (FC). 
2.3.2.1 Per Song Contract 
 Under the per song contract, the retailer will pay a wholesale price to the record 
label each time a song is downloaded. The record label acts as a Stackelberg leader in 
the chain, as the record label chooses the wholesale price before the online retailer sets 
the retail price. The retailer takes the wholesale price as predetermined and maximizes 
the retail profit. The record label anticipates this retail response and maximizes its 
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profit subject to the retail pricing decision. The record label charges a wholesale price 
per song sold of w  and incurs a marginal cost, lc . The royalty per song paid to the 
artist is the major component of the marginal cost incurred by the record label. Also, rc  
is the online retailer's marginal cost, which is mainly made up by the cost of bandwidth. 
If the total consumer market size is M , the retailer's profit in the per song contract is 
 
GwcpM rREPS )(=,   (8)
 
The record label's profit is  
 GcwM lRLPS )(=,   (9)
 
If the record label and the retailer are vertically integrated (centralized chain), the profit 
of the chain is  
 
GcpM tCCPS )(=,   (10)
 
  where lrt ccc = . 
2.3.2.2 Fixed Fee Contract 
 In the fixed fee contract, the record label charges a lump sum fee for an entire 
collection/album of songs regardless of the number of times songs are downloaded 
from the retailer's website. Depending on who is responsible for the royalty paid to 
artists, two different sub-structures can be examined. The record label may transfer the 
royalty cost responsibility to the retailer so that the retailer bears the royalty cost. This 
case is refereed to as fixed fee full transfer (FF). The profits of the record label and the 
online retailer in FF are: 
 
FFGcpM tREFF  )(=,  (11)
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 FFRLFF =,  (12)
 
 Another possible contract is for the retailer to pay the record label a larger fee 
and the record label keeps the responsibility for paying the royalty. This case is 
refereed to as fixed fee partial transfer (FP). The profits of the record label and the 
online retailer in FP are: 
 
FPGcpM rREFP  )(=,  (13)
 
 GMcFP lRLFP  =,  (14)
 
We refer to   as the fixed fee advantage, which is determined by:  
 TCPSTCFC ,,=   (15) 
 If   is positive, the FF/FP contract is better than the PS contract from the 
supply chain perspective. The record label and the retailer have to bargain over 
partitioning of the supply chain profit surplus and the actual value of FF/FP will be 
determined by the bargaining process. Many factors, such as the relative bargaining 
power between the retailer and the record label and the risk of breakdown (Muthoo 
1999) will affect FF. For example, in the simplest bargaining situation (i.e., one shot 
game between two equally powerful firms), the Nash bargaining solution, FF, will 
satisfy the following condition:  
 
2
==
,/
,,/,,/
TCFPFF
RLPSRLFPFFREPSREFPFF


 (16)
 
which implies an equal division of additional profits. In this paper, we do not discuss 
how FF/FP is determined in detail since our focus is how the contract structures and 
piracy affect channel coordination. 
  
26 
 
2.4 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SCENARIOS 
 Based on different piracy risk costs and contract arrangements, we evaluate the 
scenarios shown in Table 4. Each scenario is compared with the benchmark case in 
which the supply chain is centrally coordinated. Closed-form expressions can't be 
obtained for the general case where   is any value from the interval (0, 1). Therefore, 
we focus on the case of 2/1= , for which closed-form expressions can be derived. 
This enables us to provide insights into the problem. We examine the results under 
different values of   numerically in the Analysis section. Also, for tc<2 , no 
consumers buy a legitimate product for any profitable price. Therefore, to avoid trivial 
cases, we assume tc2 . 
Table  4: Different scenarios 
 No Piracy Linear Cost Fixed Cost 
Centralized Chain S1 S2 S3 
Per Song Contract S4 S5 S6 
Fixed Fee  
Contract 
Full Transfer S7 S8 S9 
Partial Transfer S10 S11 S12 
 
2.4.1 Centralized Supply Chain  
 The decision maker chooses the price which maximizes the total profit of the 
integrated supply chain. Although this supply chain configuration is not common in the 
music industry, it provides the maximum profit for the supply chain, and is used as the 
benchmark to which other contracts are compared. 
Proposition 2 The optimal prices for a centralized supply chain are: 
S1. No piracy:  
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S2. Linear piracy cost:  
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S3. Fixed piracy cost:  
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  where 022=    and  )2(88)2(=
22   ttt cc  
Proof. See Appendix 1 
 Proposition 2 shows that if 0
* <  , the centralized supply chain responds to 
piracy under the linear piracy cost by decreasing the price by 
2
2
** 2=


t
tL
CC
N
CC
c
c
pp . This 
implies that piracy has a little effect on the optimal price when piracy risk cost is high. 
More interestingly, for products with low marginal cost, the supply chain can lower the 
price considerably to encourage legitimate sales and discourage piracy while still being 
profitable. 
For fixed piracy cost, the optimal price when 0
* <   depends on 0 . This is 
because consumers will pirate all 0  songs when they pirate and therefore they 
compare the net gain of any purchase of 0
* <   songs to the net gain from pirating 0  
songs. The analysis indicates that piracy reduces the optimal price in the fixed cost case 
as well. This is intuitive since firms need to lower price to keep consumers from 
pirating Stone2009. However, the amount of price decline in the fixed piracy cost case 
may be less or more than the decrease in the linear case depending on problem 
parameters. For example, for 6=2 , 3= , and 2=0 , 
** < LCC
F
CC pp  for 0.428<tc . If 
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5=0 , then 
** < LCC
F
CC pp  for 0.508<tc . Therefore, when the marginal cost is small, the 
decrease in the optimal price for the fixed piracy cost case is larger than in the linear 
case. Table 5 summarizes results for the centralized chain optimum. 
Table 5: Summary of centralized chain optimums, 0
* <   
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2.4.2 Decentralized Supply Chain with Per Song Contract 
 In a decentralized chain with per song contract, the retailer pays the record label 
a wholesale price for each song sold. The record label pays a portion of this wholesale 
price to the artists in royalty. This is the most common contract arrangement between 
record labels and retailers (Bockstedt, et al. 2006). The retailer's margin per song is 
quite small since the wholesale price averages about $ 0.70 (Chen and Png 2003). 
Proposition 3 Under the per song contract, the optimal retail and wholesale prices for 
a decentralized supply chain are: 
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S4. No piracy:  
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S5. Linear piracy cost:  
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S6. Fixed piracy cost: 
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  where rcw=   
Proof. See Appendix 1 
 Table 6 summarizes the results for the decentralized chain with per song 
contract. An interesting result from Table 6 is that 2=
*
,
*
,
N
RLPS
N
REPS


 in the no piracy case 
which implies that the retailer makes twice as much profit as the record label. This is 
the opposite of the classic supply chain profit distribution under a Stackelberg 
                                                          
 
1
 *w is obtained under the condition 0
* <   
2
 we're unable to obtain the closed-form solution for w  in the fixed piracy cost case 
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equilibrium and linear demand where the manufacturer makes twice as much profit as 
the retailer (Chiang, et al. 2003). Another noteworthy finding is that changes in the 
piracy risk cost, 2 , not only change total supply chain profit but also change the 
distribution of profit between the retailer and the record label. As 2  increases 
(through increasing efforts to combat piracy), total supply chain profit will increase. 
However, the retailer gets a larger share of the surplus profit leaving the record label a 
smaller share. We will provide more insights about the relationship between the profit 
distribution and the piracy risk cost in the Analysis section. 
Table 6 : Summary of decentralized supply chain optimums with per song contract 
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Table 6 (continued) 
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2.4.3 Decentralized Supply Chain with Fixed Fee Contract 
 If a fixed fee contract is used in the decentralized chain, the retailer pays the 
record label a fixed fee in exchange for being able to sell songs from a record label's 
album/collection to the public. Depending on who is responsible for the royalty 
payment to artists, two fixed fee contract types, full transfer and partial transfer, can be 
considered. 
2.4.3.1 Fixed Fee Full Transfer Contract 
Proposition 4 The optimal retail prices for a decentralized supply chain with fixed fee 
full transfer contract are: 
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S9. Fixed piracy cost:  
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Proof. See Appendix 1 
 Proposition 4 shows that the optimal retail price under the FF contract is the 
same as the optimal retail price of the fully coordinated chain. Consequently, the total 
supply chain profit under the FF contract is the same as the profit in the centrally 
coordinated supply chain. In the no piracy case, the range of lump sum payment that 
yields the same or greater profits for the decentralized record label and retailer than 
under the per song contract is:  
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 , there exists a fixed fee payment under which both 
parties are better off. Table 7 summarizes results in the fixed fee full transfer contract. 
Table 7: Summary of fixed fee full transfer contract optimums, 0
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Table 7 (continued) 
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2.4.3.2 Fixed Fee Partial Transfer Contract 
Proposition 5 The optimal retail prices for a decentralized supply chain with fixed fee 
partial transfer contract are: 
S10. No piracy:  
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S11. Linear piracy cost:  
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S12. Fixed piracy cost:  
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Proof. See Appendix 1 
 Note that the optimal prices for this contract are independent of the marginal 
cost of the record label. For the fixed fee partial transfer contract, the fee that yields the 
same or greater supply chain profit than the per song contract in the no piracy case is:  
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Equation (32) implies that if rl cc
2
1
<<0  then there is a fixed fee under which the fixed 
fee partial transfer contract can leave both the retailer and the record label better off 
than in the per song contract. Since there is no wholesale price under this contract, and 
the retailer is not responsible for the royalty, the fixed fee partial transfer contract is 
better than the per song contract when the royalty (the major component of lc ) is small 
relative to rc . In this case, the retailer charges higher price due to the large rc  and sells 
less songs which reduces the royalty cost paid by the record label.  
Given *p  and *  for each scenario, we can show that total supply chain profit 
under fixed fee full transfer contract is always greater than the total supply chain profit 
in both per song and fixed fixed fee partial transfer contracts. Table 8 summarizes the 
results for the fixed fee partial transfer contract. 
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Table 8: Summary of fixed fee partial transfer contract optimums, 0
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2.5 ANALYSIS 
 There are a number of interesting results related to managing a digital music 
channel under piracy. We begin by discussing the impact of piracy on supply chain 
profits as well as profits distribution between the online retailer and the record label. 
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2.5.1 Piracy Implication 
Finding 1 Piracy will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. The decrease in supply 
chain profits depends on the type of piracy risk cost of consumers. 
 In the no piracy case, the probability of purchase, if the net gain is positive, is 
1=NG  which is always greater than or euqal to the linear piracy cost probability of 
purchase LG  and the fixed piracy cost probability of purchase FG . Thus, the following 
condition is satisfied:  
 Nt
FLFL
t
FL GcpMGcpM  )()( *or*or*or*   
Also, for any p , the following condition is satisfied as well.  
 Nt
NN
t
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The above two inequalities yield  
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NN
t
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t
FL GcpMGcpMGcpM  )(<)()( **or*or*or*   
Therefore, piracy will reduce the profit of the supply chain. 
An interesting result is that the magnitude of supply chain profit loss is related 
to the type of piracy risk costs. As shown in Figure 3, when the upper limit on piracy 
cost, 2 , is relatively small, the total chain profit under the linear piracy cost is greater 
than the profit under the fixed piracy cost. However, as 2  increases, the total chain 
profit under the fixed piracy cost becomes larger than the linear case. This result 
indicates that, if consumers' piracy risk costs are low, the supply chain suffers more 
from the fixed piracy cost. 
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Figure 3: Total chain profits vs. piracy cost for the per song contract ( rc = 0.15, 
lc = 0.25, 1 , 2 = 0, 1 = 1, 0 = 10, M = 10) 
In addition to 2 , profits also depend on 1  and 0 . Figure 4 shows that when 
1  is large, i.e. high valuation for songs, and/or 0  is large which is the case for 
popular artists, total supply chain profit is greater in the linear piracy cost case. In other 
words, popular artists suffer more from piracy when consumers have fixed piracy cost. 
In the case of no piracy and linear piracy, 0  does not affect total chain profit because 
consumers buy only the songs which maximize their net gain. However, when the 
piracy cost is fixed, consumers pirate all 0  songs where their marginal valuation for 
songs become zero. Popular artists usually have higher 0 , which, in turn, makes 
pirating even more attractive for consumers. Another interesting result is the shape of 
total chain profit vs. 1  in the fixed piracy cost. Unlike the other two cases, the total 
chain profit under the fixed piracy cost increases for a range of 1  and then start 
decreasing. A closer examination shows that although consumers' valuation for songs 
increases, the price stays relatively constant in the fixed piracy cost case. Hence, 
consumers who decide to purchase songs would purchase more songs and the total 
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chain profit increases. However, as 1  increases further, piracy becomes more 
preferable by consumers which reduces the pricing power of the retailer and decreases 
total chain profit. 
 
Figure 4: Total chain profits vs. 1  and 0  ( rc = 0.15, lc = 0.25, 1 , 2 = 0, 1 = 
1, 2 = 3, 0 = 10, M = 10) 
Finding 2 Changes in the piracy risk cost not only change total supply chain profit but 
also change the distribution of the profit between the retailer and the record label. 
 Figure 5 shows that as 2  increases, total supply chain profit increases. Total 
chain profit is a concave increasing function of 2  indicating that the positive marginal 
impact of 2  is decreasing. This is because the probability of purchasing a legitimate 
product becomes close to 1 for high 2 , thus most consumers will buy a legitimate 
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product rather than pirate. However, Figure 4 shows that the profit of the retailer 
increases more than the profit of the record label. 
Let 2̂  be the value of 2  at which 
*
,
*
, =
L
RLPS
L
REPS  , i.e. each party gets 50% of 
the chain's profits. For values of 2  satisfying 22
ˆ<  , the record label gets more than 
50% of the supply chain profit. Suppose )( 2f  is a convex increasing function 
denoting the amount of investment in deterrent and preventive piracy controls needed 
to increase piracy risk cost (i.e. increase to 2 ). If 22
ˆ<   then, Figure 6 shows that it 
is more profitable for the record label to invest in combating piracy since the label 
keeps a large share of the profit. However, as 2  increases, it becomes less profitable 
for the record label to invest in combating piracy since )( 2f  is convex and the record 
label's share of the supply chain profit decreases. If 22 ̂  , the retailer keeps a larger 
share of the profits leaving the record label with a smaller share which may make the 
record label's investment in combating piracy suboptimal. 
 
(a) Linear Piracy Risk Cost 
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(b) Fixed Piracy Risk Cost 
Figure 5: Profits vs. piracy cost under linear and fixed risk cost for the per song 
contract ( rc = 0.15, lc = 0.25, 1 , 2 = 0, 1 = 1, 0 = 10, M = 10) 
 
 
(a) Linear Piracy Risk Cost 
 
(b) Fixed Piracy Risk Cost 
Figure 6: Profit distribution vs. piracy cost for the per song contract ( rc = 0.15, 
lc = 0.25, 1 , 2 = 0, 1 = 1, 0 = 10, M = 10) 
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Finding 3 In the fixed piracy risk cost case, supply chain profit decreases in 0 , the 
number of songs where the consumer's marginal valuation becomes zero. 
 In the case of fixed piracy cost, 0  has a significant impact on supply chain 
profits. As shown in Figure 7, total chain profit under all contracts decreases as 0  
increases, which is counter-intuitive. This is due to the fact that consumers in this case 
will pirate all 0  songs when they pirate, thus large 0  makes net gain from pirating 
larger and the supply chain less profitable. If everything is held constant except for 0  
and 2 , then setting 
*
,
F
TCPS  equal to zero gives the curve in Figure 8. This figure shows 
that as 2  increases, more consumers buy rather than pirate, thus the total chain's profit 
increases. On the other hand, since consumers pirate all 0  songs when they pirate, the 
profitable region shrinks as 0  increases. 
 The distribution of the profit between the retailer and the record label in the 
fixed piracy cost case follows a similar pattern to the linear piracy cost (refer to Figure 
6.b). However, the decreasing rate of the record label profit share is steeper indicating 
that the record label share of the profit can be significantly reduced even with a small 
increase in 2 . Given the impact of different piracy risk costs, the next question is 
which contract type is the best from a total supply chain perspective. The following 
subsection answers this question. 
42 
 
 
Figure 7: Profits vs. 0  under fixed piracy risk cost ( rc = 0.35, lc = 0.15, 1 , 2
= 0, 1 = 1, 2 = 3, M = 10) 
 
Figure 8: Profitable values of 2  and 0  under fixed piracy risk cost ( rc = 0.15, 
lc = 0.25, 1 , 2 = 0, 1 = 1, M = 10) 
2.5.2 Implication of Contract Structure 
Finding 4 For any (0,1) , fixed fee full transfer contract will always fully coordinate 
the supply chain. 
 In a fully coordinated supply chain, the optimal retail price ( *p ) satisfies the 
following conditions:  
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And the profit of centralized supply chain is:  
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If the retailer and record label adopts the fixed fee full transfer contract, the optimal 
retail price (i.e., *FFp ) satisfies the following condition:  
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 And, the total supply chain profit is:  
 GcpM FFtFFTCFF
***
, )(=   
 Therefore, ** = FFCC pp , and 
*
,
* = TCFFCC   and the fixed fee full transfer contract 
coordinates the chain. 
 We numerically examine the fixed fee advantage where the total supply chain is 
better off relative to the per song contract for two fixed fee structures and the two 
piracy risk costs. If this advantage is positive, we assume the record label and the 
retailer can find a satisfactory division of the profit surplus. 
Finding 5 Fixed fee contract (both FF and FP) becomes more profitable as 
1) The upper limit on the piracy risk cost, 2 , increases, 
2) The market size, M , increases, and 
3) The marginal costs, rc  and lc , decrease. 
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 Figure 9 shows that as 2  and M  increase, the fixed fee full transfer advantage 
increases most in both the linear and fixed piracy cost cases. Given the increasing trend 
of digital music sales and continuous efforts to combat piracy, this result indicates that 
the fixed fee full transfer is the most preferable type of contract. 
 
Figure 9: Fixed fee advantage vs. 2  and M  ( rc = 0.35, lc = 0.15, 1 , 2 = 0, 
1 = 1, 0 = 10) 
Figure 10 shows that, as rc  and lc  increase, the fixed fee advantage decreases 
in both the linear and fixed piracy cost cases. The royalty paid to artists is the major 
component of lc , and therefore it is likely that the record label's marginal cost wouldn't 
change drastically in the future. On the other hand, major components of rc  such as the 
bandwidth cost can be reduced gradually as technology advances. The fixed fee full 
45 
 
transfer contract is significantly better than the per song contract as the retailer's 
marginal costs decrease.  
 
Figure 10: Fixed fee advantage vs. rc  and lc  ( 1  = 1, 2  = 3, 0  = 10, M  = 
10, 1 , 2  = 0) 
An interesting finding is the shape of fixed fee advantage vs. rc  in the fixed fee 
partial transfer case. As shown in Figure 10, the fixed fee advantage becomes positive 
and increasing for a range of rc  and then decreases. We suspect that this is due to the 
unique characteristics of fixed fee partial transfer contract as well as the non-linear 
demand. Unlike full transfer, the online retailer in the partial transfer contract only 
takes rc  into account in her pricing decision. Therefore, at low values of rc , the retailer 
sets the price at a low value to maximize her profit, and large number of songs is sold. 
The royalty cost paid by the record label is large enough to wipe out the record label's 
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profit and therefore there is no feasible FP contract for low values of rc . As rc  
increases, the retailer raises the price causing a sales decline large enough to reduce the 
royalty cost which makes the FP contract feasible. As rc  increases further, the fixed fee 
advantage starts decreasing due to decline in the retailer's profit. 
2.5.3 Numerical Experiment on Different Shapes of the Utility Function 
 To verify the robustness of our results with respect to the value of   and to 
examine the effects of different parameters, we conducted an experiment with different 
parameter settings for  , rc , lc , 1 , and, 0 . The problems were solved for both linear 
and fixed piracy cost, and each parameter was set at three levels resulting in 
233333  = 486 cases as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Different parameter settings 
  rc  lc  1  0  Piracy cost 
0.2 0.1 0.1 1 1 Linear 
0.5 0.25 0.25 3 5 Fixed 
0.8 0.4 0.4 5 10  
  
 The results indicate that the shape of the profit distribution between the record 
label and the retailer holds for all parameter setting in the linear piracy cost case. For 
the few cases where 0
* =   (Figure 11.b), the same pattern for profit distribution also 
holds. Again, as 2  increases, the retailer keeps a larger share of profits leaving the 
record label with smaller share. Similarly, our analysis shows that the previous pattern 
of the distribution of profits holds in the fixed piracy cost case. 
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(a) 0
*   , Linear Piracy Risk Cost 
 
(b) 0
* =  , Linear Piracy Risk Cost 
Figure 11: Profit distribution vs. piracy cost under the per song contract 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 We developed a model for analyzing the impact of piracy and supply chain 
contracts on the performance of supply chains for one type of digital experience good - 
music. In our model, the product is transmitted digitally through a pure online channel. 
The consumer's risk cost of piracy is divided into two cases: 1) linear risk cost and 2) 
fixed risk cost, based on whether the risk cost a consumer attaches to piracy depends 
on the amount of content pirated or not. We also examine two different contract types 
that record labels and online retailers may enter into, a fixed fee contract and a per song 
contract. We derive a variety of implications for the different cases and demonstrated 
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the robustness of our results using a numerical experiment. 
 From the perspective of a manager, understanding consumers' risk cost with 
respect to music piracy is critical since it has many implications for pricing and piracy 
control strategies. For example, consistent with the finding in (Khouja and Park 2007), 
we show that the optimal price in the presence of piracy is always lower than or equal 
to the price assuming no piracy. This suggests that it is optimal for record labels and 
online retailers to price products with full consideration of piracy. In addition, we 
demonstrate that the magnitude of supply chain profit loss is related to the type of 
piracy risk cost. Assuming that consumers' propensity toward piracy is currently low, 
changing consumers' perception of piracy risk cost toward the linear case (e.g. charging 
a penalty based on the amount of songs pirated) can provide more profits to the chain. 
Also, retailers should pursue different strategies depending on the popularity of 
artists/songs. When the fixed piracy risk cost is dominant, popular songs and/or artists 
suffer more from piracy. Hence, different pricing policies through subscription, 
quantity discount, and bundling can be an effective strategy for popular artists since 
they encourage legitimate sales while discouraging piracy. 
We also find that increasing consumers' piracy risk cost through preventive and 
deterrent controls does not equally benefit both record labels and retailers under the per 
song contract. As consumers' piracy risk cost increases through piracy controls, the 
record label's share of supply chain profit decreases while the retailer's share increases. 
Interestingly, most evidence suggest that the record labels have lead the effort in 
combating digital piracy (O'Rourke 2004, Wade 2004), which may be due to the fact 
that they believe the consumers' risk cost is currently very low and they benefit the 
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most from increasing it. However, record labels should adjust their strategies as the 
piracy risk cost changes. If consumers' piracy risk cost is beyond certain threshold, it 
will be better for the record label not to make an investment in piracy control and leave 
it up to the retailer to do so. 
Finally, we show that the fixed fee full transfer contract dominates partial 
transfer and per song contracts suggesting a need for new licensing models for digital 
online music sales. This dominance increases when the piracy risk cost and the market 
size for online music increase, and when marginal costs decrease. Unlike other 
industries in the digital goods business, such as movie rental chains, which engaged in 
improving market conditions through contractual innovation (e.g. revenue-sharing 
(Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Liu and Zhang 2006)), the music industry's response has 
been limited. Optimal supply chain performance can be achieved if firms coordinate by 
contracting using fixed fee payments under which the total supply chain's profit 
improves. The per song contract is currently the most common contract type in the 
music industry, but we demonstrate the superiority of fixed fee full transfer contract 
relative to the per song contract.  
 The proposed model has several limitations. First, the model focuses on the 
relationship between the record label and online retailer, and does not consider other 
important players in the chain such as artists and government. Second, while our model 
considers heterogeneous consumer valuations for songs, we assume that the valuation 
diminishes at the same rate. Third, our model does not consider different pricing 
strategies such as subscription pricing, quantity discounts, non-linear pricing, or a 
mixed per unit and subscription pricing. The above limitations guide us to several areas 
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for future research. In our model, two different types of consumer risk costs are 
assumed based on the amount of content pirated. Therefore, it would be interesting to 
empirically explore how consumers actually evaluate the risk cost of piracy. Also, 
simulation techniques such as an agent-based modeling (ABM) can be promising to 
relax some of the limiting assumptions that we mentioned. The use of ABM may 
enable us to analyze agents' (i.e. retailer, record label, and consumers) behavior, 
motives, and interactions and to examine their consequences in terms of aggregate 
system behavior. It would also help us to incorporate various coordination strategies 
such as different pricing schemes and approaches to combat piracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF CONSUMER 
PIRACY RISK: THE CASE OF ILLEGAL MUSIC DOWNLOADS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 The prevalence of unauthorized copying and dissemination has been a serious 
threat in the digital experience goods industries. In the music industry, for example, the 
rapid developments of compression and file-sharing technologies as well as the 
decreasing cost of copying mediums have provided consumers with greater access to 
free music than ever before. A report from the Institute for Policy Innovation (IPI) 
shows that illegal music file-sharing result in $12.5 billion of economic damage and 
loss of 71,060 jobs every year in the United States (IFPI 2009).  
In response to illegal music downloading, the music industry has employed a 
number of strategies to combat piracy including innovation, education, and 
enforcement. Despite various anti-piracy efforts, there is little evidence that these 
policies have successfully decreased piracy levels (Sinha and Mandel 2008). 
Technological preventive controls using piracy-prevention software and hardware (e.g. 
Digital Right Management) have been implemented, however, they have often had 
limited success, and imposed unfair restrictions on what legitimate consumers can do 
with the songs they have bought (Stone 2009). Also, even with the clear articulation of 
digital copyright law and legal as well as educational deterrence efforts, piracy is still 
prevalent due to the high cost of increasing consumers' awareness and of enforcing the 
law. Thus, it is likely that piracy will remain a serious problem well into the future. 
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The significant loss in revenue due to piracy has spurred research on 
understanding of consumer piracy behaviors. Previous research in this area has focused 
on the influence of social, economic, and behavioral factors on the intention to engage 
in piracy. Although several theoretical models have been proposed to explain 
consumers’ ethical decision-making process in the context of piracy, there have been 
little research undertaken to formally assess various types of risk involved in piracy 
behavior. A few studies have examined how different risks may affect consumer piracy 
decisions (Chiou, et al. 2005, Tan 2002), but no attempts have yet been made to 
identify all aspects of consumer piracy risk when they illegally download content, and 
to what extent different risk components contribute to an overall piracy risk. There are 
various aspects of risk involved in consumer piracy behavior. In order to assess the 
extent and nature of piracy behavior, components of consumer piracy risk should be 
theoretically and operationally defined. Therefore, an important step to advance our 
knowledge would be the development of a measure for the construct of consumer 
piracy risk. Such measure would enable researchers and practitioners to quantify risk, 
which is one of the most important steps in the risk assessment process (Barki, et al. 
1993) as well as provide valuable insights into how to develop effective strategies to 
deal with digital piracy. 
The objective of this study is to develop a theoretical and operational basis for 
conceptualizing a measurement model of consumer piracy risk. Adapted from 
Perceived Risk Theory (Bauer 1960, Bauer 1967), we identify components of 
consumer piracy risk and empirically test their importance in the context of illegal 
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music downloads 
3
. In addition to examining the components of consumer piracy risk, 
we also explore how consumers assess their piracy risk with respect to the amount of 
content they pirate. For example, if a consumer perceives a high probability of 
prosecution, she is more likely to perceive higher risk as the number of songs she 
pirates increases. In contrast, some consumers may be conscious about their image, or 
they may have a desire to be identified with certain social group. In such a case, the 
pirating behavior can be perceived as being unethical regardless of how many songs 
are pirated. Many piracy acts may involve pirating more than one song, but it is unclear 
whether consumer piracy risk is increasing or fixed with the content pirated. Therefore, 
we investigate the relationship between the amount of content pirated and each 
component of piracy risk. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents relevant 
theoretical perspectives in the area of consumer ethical decision making processes and 
piracy behavior. Section 3.3 provides the theoretical foundation of our research model 
and discusses it in further details. Section 3.4 outlines the research methodology, and 
Section 3.5 presents the results of data analysis. Finally, Section 3.6 contains 
managerial implications, conclusions, and directions for future research.  
  
                                                          
 
3
 While piracy of digital music through physical CDs is also common, we focus on digital piracy where 
files are shared through peer-to-peer networks. P2P networks have been known as a major distribution 
channel for unauthorized software and audio files. 
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3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR UNDERSTANDING CONSUMER 
PIRACY RISK 
 Understanding consumer piracy behavior has received significant attention in 
marketing, consumer ethics, and information system literature. Many theoretical 
models such as the four component model (Moores and Chang 2006), issue-contingent 
model (Chiou, et al. 2005, Tan 2002), theory of planned behavior (Cronan and Al-
Rafee 2008, Peace, et al. 2003), ethical decision-making theory (Thong and Yap 1998), 
and deterrence theory (Peace, et al. 2003, Wolfe, et al. 2008) have been proposed to 
explain and predict consumers’ intention to engage in digital piracy. 
Despite the fact that there is growing body of literature on consumer piracy 
behavior, there is limited understanding of how to assess consumer piracy risk. 
Different theories mentioned above are more relevant for assessing the process behind 
the piracy behavior of individuals rather than evaluating and measuring the uncertainty 
and/or risk involved in the piracy behavior. To identify and measure different aspects 
of risk involved in consumers’ piracy behavior, a theory that provides a more 
applicable measurement perspective need to be developed. A further examination of 
literature within information systems and marketing suggests that the perceived risk 
theory can be helpful in assessing the multifaceted nature of consumer piracy risk. The 
measurement of consumer piracy risk based on the perceived risk theory can capture 
multiple components of risk involved in consumer piracy behavior, and provide insight 
into the nature of interrelationship among risk components. In this regard, the 
perceived risk theory is chosen as our theoretical model for conceptualizing consumer 
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piracy risk. Prior to reporting scale development process, we introduce the notion of 
perceived risk and prior attempts to measure this construct.  
The perceived risk has been formally defined as “a combination of uncertainty 
plus seriousness of outcome involved” (Bauer 1967).  In the context of consumer 
choice, perceived risk is “the expectation of loss associated with purchase and acts as 
an inhibitor to purchase behavior” (Peter and Ryan 1976). Since the concept was 
introduced by Bauer, much research has been devoted to measuring risk and building a 
formal model and developing its components. Perceived risk has been modeled as both 
a two-dimensional construct (i.e., uncertainty and negative consequences) (Bauer 
1960), and a multidimensional construct, including financial, performance, physical, 
psychological, and social risk (Jacoby and Kaplan 1972). Several other components of 
perceived risk were added later such as time risk (Roselius 1971) and source credibility 
risk (McCorkle 1990).  
The perceived risk construct has been used extensively in the marketing and 
consumer behavior literature for wide-ranging topics such as counterfeit brand 
(Veloutsou and Bian 2008), and mail-order and retail store shopping (Jasper and 
Ouellette 1994, Spence, et al. 1970). Within the IS literature, the construct has been 
applied in the area of e-service adoption (Featherman and Pavlou 2003), Internet 
banking (Littler and Melanthiou 2006), and online shopping (Forsythe and Shi 2003, 
Garbarino and Strahilevitz 2004, Miazaki and Fernandez 2005). Few studies have 
examined the impact of perceived risks on consumer piracy behavior. For example, 
Tan (2002) considered four dimensions of perceived risks including financial, 
performance, prosecution, and social risk on the intention to purchase pirated software. 
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The author found that those components are significant in predicting intention to pirate 
(Tan 2002). Also, Chiou et al. (2005) developed a model of consumer’s music piracy 
intention formation including six constructs influencing the attitude toward music 
piracy: Singer/band idolization, perceived prosecution risk, perceived magnitude of 
consequence, perceived social consequence, perceived proximity, and attributive 
satisfaction. They found that perceived prosecution risk was found to significantly 
influence attitude toward music piracy (Chiou, et al. 2005). However, these two studies 
are limited since they incorporated only a few components of consumer piracy risk, and 
did not examine the extent to which different risk components contribute to an overall 
piracy risk. 
We model consumer piracy risk as a higher-order construct formed by multi-
dimensional sub-constructs. The use of multi-dimensional conceptualization provides 
valuable information about various types of risk involved in consumer piracy behavior 
and the relative importance of each risk dimension. 
3.3 A THEORETICAL DOMAIN OF CONSUMER PIRACY RISK 
 A review of perceived risk studies reveals that the importance of various 
perceived risk components varies widely across different situations. In other words, 
perceived risk appears to be extremely context-dependent (Jacoby and Kaplan 1972). 
Among several components of perceived risk, performance, financial, social, and 
prosecution risk have been previously considered in the piracy domain (Tan 2002). In 
addition to those four components, we also include three other risk components that 
relevant in the context of illegal music downloads: psychological, time, and privacy 
risk. 
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3.3.1 Measures of Consumer Piracy Risk 
3.3.1.1 Performance Risk 
 Performance risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities may create a loss 
due to malfunctioning and not performing as designed. Consumers face performance 
risk since the pirated copy may not function as perfectly as a legitimate product or as it 
was designed. Operational measures related to performance risk are the quality of 
pirated content and the possibility of content pollution. A recent study by Bhattacharjee 
et al. (2006) shows that less than 10 percent of music files available on a popular P2P 
network were considered high or near CD quality. They also conducted a survey to 
analyze consumer perception of quality of music and found that although the acoustic 
quality of music files from illegal networks was perceived as “very good”, it was not 
the same as the quality of audio CDs (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006b). These results 
suggest that consumers who download music files from P2P sites may perceive the 
quality of a pirated product to be inferior to some extent to the quality of legitimate 
product. Furthermore, polluted or bad copies are widely available on many P2P 
networks. The music industry has been involved in the dissemination of polluted 
content on P2P networks by spreading corrupted copies. Using this mechanism, a 
music company attempts to decrease the popularity of the file and to make it more 
difficult for users to download a good copy (Benevenuto, et al. 2006). Liang et al. 
(2005) showed that more than 50% of copies and versions of a popular file that were 
found by searching the FastTrack network were polluted (Liang, et al. 2005).  
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3.3.1.2 Financial Risk 
 Financial risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities will cause a monetary 
loss. Operational measures related to the financial risk are re-installment of software 
and data recovery due to viruses and malwares from file-sharing programs. P2P 
networks have been known to be vulnerable to many security attacks. One study 
reports that 44% of the 4,778 executable files downloaded through a KaZaA client 
application contained malicious code like viruses and Trojan horses (Shin, et al. 2006). 
Yahoo Tech also reports that many MP3 files that are being shared contain a Trojan 
horse program that has attacked over half a million computers in a week (Null 2008). 
The fear of computer viruses can influence consumers’ decision to engage in digital 
piracy since viruses can delete or change files, slow down the computer system, and 
change security settings so that hackers can get an access to the pirating systems 
anytime. It is difficult to get accurate virus damage statistics, but one can argue that the 
financial damage caused by virus activities is substantial and is on the rise. For 
example, computer virus attacks caused global businesses an estimated $55 billion in 
damages in 2003, according to Trend Micro Inc (Tan 2004). 
3.3.1.3 Social Risk 
 Social risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities will cause a loss of status 
in one’s social group such as family, peers, and colleagues. Social risk is concerned 
with an individual’s perception of other people, and is related to potential loss of status 
in one’s social group as a result of pirating behavior. Subjective norms, also often 
referred to as peer norms, are the individual’s perception of pressures from the social 
environment. This is the pressure that the individual feels from family, friends, and 
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colleagues (Peace, et al. 2003). Consumers may be conscious of the image they project 
to their peers, and they may desire to be identified with certain social groups. Prior 
studies suggest that the possibility of discovering criminal action by friends and family 
can be perceived as a form of risk, and family disapproval may have a significant 
impact on deterring the behavior (Wolfe, et al. 2008). In this study, the social risk is 
operationalized based on loss of respect, negative image, and negative social status. 
3.3.1.4 Prosecution Risk 
 Prosecution risk is defined as the risk that the acquisition of a pirated product 
would subject the pirates to legal prosecution. A consumer survey by IFPI reports that 
50% of respondents stopped or reduced downloading music files from P2P networks 
due to fear of legal consequences (IFPI 2006). Other studies also showed that 
prosecution risk is important in influencing consumers’ piracy attitude (Chiou, et al. 
2005, Tan 2002). Downloading unauthorized music files are infringement on copyright 
law, and consumers run the risk of civil action by the copyright holders. Under current 
copyright law, people who violate the law can be held liable for up to $150,000 per 
violation although most lawsuit targets settle their cases for amounts ranging from 
$3,000 to $11,000 (EFF 2008). In this study, the prosecution risk is operationalized 
based on punishment (law-suit or penalty) for the violation of copyright law. 
3.3.1.5 Time Risk 
 Time risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities will cause potential time 
and effort loss due to technological problems. Operational measures related to time risk 
are lost time due to the search process and network congestion. Studies have shown 
that people cut back on the use of P2P networks because they frequently could not find 
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songs that they would like to download (IFPI 2006). The process of obtaining content 
in P2P network is different from purchasing songs from online stores which provide a 
unified interface with various value-added services. Users of P2P network must 
navigate a complex environment to locate content (time spent looking for an illegal 
copies) and endure varying levels of downloading time due to congestion which 
diminishes the quality of the process. It also requires additional time to learn how to 
use different file sharing programs and how to protect their systems from any possible 
intrusions.  
3.3.1.6 Psychological Risk 
 Psychological risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities will have a 
negative effect on the consumer’s mind such as tension or psychological discomfort. 
Contemporary deterrence theory suggests that, in addition to punishment certainty and 
severity, guilt, shame, and embarrassment can also be effective measures to reduce the 
likelihood of committing criminal acts (Peace, et al. 2003, Wolfe, et al. 2008). When 
consumers perceive pirating activities as being risky, for any of numerous reasons, this 
creates a tension or psychological discomfort. The feelings of discomfort or tension 
may come from various sources. It may arise when a person perceives a situation as an 
ethical dilemma or possibly when they hear the music industry is launching large 
number of lawsuits against individuals for copyright infringement. The psychological 
risk is operationalized based on unwanted anxiety, loss of self-image and concept, and 
psychological discomfort. 
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3.3.1.7 Privacy Risk 
 Privacy risk is defined as the risk that pirating activities will cause a loss of 
private and confidential information. Privacy risk has been considered in the literature 
with regard to predicting e-services adoption (Featherman and Pavlou 2003, Lim 2003). 
The studies show that privacy risk plays a significant role in the adoption intention of 
e-services. In the context of music piracy, the privacy risk is operationalized as the loss 
of confidential information due to file-sharing activities.  
When consumers are connected to file-sharing programs, they may 
unintentionally allow others to access confidential files that they did not intend to share 
such as email messages, medical records, and other personal and financial documents. 
A recent study by Good and Krekelberg (2003) found that a large number of KaZaa 
users seem to be unknowingly sharing personal and private files as a result of system 
misconfiguration, and that some users are indeed taking advantage of this information 
(Good and Krekelberg 2003). In addition, file-sharing programs may install other 
software known as spyware on the pirating system. Spyware monitors a user’s 
browsing habits and then sends that information to third parties. A number of popular 
P2P file sharing programs have been found to install spyware onto users’ computers, 
often without their knowledge (Stafford and Urbaczewski 2004). The user gets 
advertisements based on the information that the spyware has collected and forwarded 
to these third parties. Therefore, unintentional sharing of confidential information as 
well as collecting user activities can severely erode consumers’ privacy. 
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Table 10: Consumer piracy risk dimensions 
Dimensions Description - Definition 
Performance  
risk 
The risk that pirating activities will create a loss due to 
malfunctioning and not performing as designed 
Financial risk 
The risk that pirating activities will cause a monetary loss due to re-
installment of software and data recovery 
Time risk 
The risk that pirating activities will cause potential time and effort 
loss due to technological problems 
Social risk 
The risk that pirating activities will cause a loss of status in one’s 
social group such as family, peers, and colleagues 
Psychological 
risk 
The risk that pirating activities will have a negative effect on the 
consumer’s well-being such as tension or psychological discomfort 
Privacy risk 
The risk that pirating activities will cause a loss of private and 
confidential information 
Prosecution 
risk 
The risk that pirating activities will cause a legal prosecution 
 
To summarize, a number of dimensions components of consumers’ overall 
piracy risk have been identified as illustrated in Table 10. These components are 
performance, financial, time, social, psychological, privacy, prosecution risk. These 
seven components will help us understand the multi-faceted nature of consumer piracy 
risk by capturing the importance of each dimension in the overall piracy risk 
assessment process. We model the consumer piracy risk construct as a second-order 
factor with reflective measures for the first-order factors and formative measures for 
the second order factor. Formative operationalization to model the relationship between 
the overall piracy risk and its dimensions was used for following reasons. Formative 
measures are commonly used for constructs considered as composites of specific 
component variables (Chin 1998). In this study, the overall consumer piracy risk 
constructs are formed with indicators that reflect different types of risks. Consequently, 
the direction of causality is from indicator to construct (i.e., formative). Also, positive 
inter-correlations among risk components are not expected which is the main 
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characteristic in the formative measurement model (Edwards and Bagozzi 2000). For 
example, downloading illegal songs from file-sharing programs may involve high 
prosecution risk, but not necessarily high social risk. Lastly, the perceived risk 
construct has been considered as the second-order formative measurement in prior 
studies (Kim, et al. 2008, Mitchell 1999, Stone and Gronhaug 1993). 
3.3.2 Consumer Piracy Risk and the Relationship with the Amount of Content Pirated 
 The relationship between perceived piracy risk and the amount of content 
pirated has critical implications for consumer choice and pricing. We use a simple 
numerical example to illustrate this concept. Suppose, a consumer is interested in 
obtaining five songs and the reservation prices for each song in decreasing order are 
$1.50, $1.25, $1.00, $0.75 and $0.50. In the case of linear piracy risk cost, the risk cost 
a consumer attaches to piracy increases linearly in the number of songs pirated. In this 
example, the cost is $1.00 per song. In the fixed piracy risk cost, the risk cost is 
assigned to the piracy session no matter how many songs are pirated. In this example, 
the cost is $2.50 per piracy session. The consumer will purchase legitimate products if 
the net gain from purchasing them is positive and is greater than the net gain from 
pirating. If the songs are sold for $0.99 each, then consumers’ decision is shown in 
Table 11. The example shows that the consumer’s decision to either purchase/pirate is 
different in the two cases depending on the number of songs the consumer is interested 
in getting. The consumer would purchase legitimate copies up to 5 songs in the linear 
risk cost case since the net gain from purchasing is larger than the gain from pirating. 
However, in the case of fixed risk cost, the consumer would pirate when the number of 
songs is three or more.  
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Table 11: Numerical example of consumer piracy risk and the number of contents 
pirated 
 
Number of Songs 
1 2 3 4 5 
Net Gain (Purchase) 0.51 0.76 0.78 0.54 -0.20 
Linear 
Net Gain (Pirate) 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.50 -0.25 
Decision Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase 
Fixed 
Net Gain (Pirate) -1.50 0.25 1.25 2.00 2.25 
Decision Purchase Purchase Pirate Pirate Pirate 
 
Prior empirical studies have not focused on the relationship between 
consumers’ piracy risk and the amount of content they pirate. Researchers used 
different measurement terms such as a single unit (“the pirated software”) (Limayem, 
et al. 2004, Tan 2002), multiple units (“pirated music products” or “copies of pirated 
software”) (Moores and Chang 2006), or a general term (“music/software piracy”) 
(Chiou, et al. 2005), and implicitly assumed that the piracy risk is either be fixed or 
increasing in content. 
Piracy may involve pirating more than one song in a single piracy session, but it 
is not clear how consumers assess their piracy risk with respect to the amount of 
content they pirate. It is possible that consumers’ piracy risk increases in the number of 
songs pirated, or it could be fixed once a consumer violates copyright law. The 
rationale for fixed piracy risk in a session is that some consumers may expect that the 
largest piracy risk cost occurs in pirating the first song and the marginal cost of pirating 
more songs diminishes very quickly after that. The extreme case occurs when the 
whole piracy risk is perceived by the consumer in pirating the first song. We examine 
the relationship between the amount of content pirated and each dimension of 
consumer piracy risk. 
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3.3.2.1 Piracy risk components expected to increase with the amount of content pirated 
 We expect that the prosecution, time, performance, privacy, and financial risk 
components of piracy risk will increase with the number of content pirated. Since 
September 2003, the recording industry has filed, settled, or threatened legal actions 
against at least 30,000 individuals who have used P2P networks. According to the 
RIAA, most people sued were sharing 1,000 songs or more on the file-swapping 
networks (EFF 2008). This suggests that the more a consumer shares or downloads 
files from P2P networks, the higher the probability that she will be sued. Therefore, 
there might be a positive relationship between the amount of content pirated and the 
prosecution risk.  
In order to download pirated music, consumers should install file-sharing 
programs and be connected to networks. As the amount of time during which they are 
connected to the file-sharing networks increases, there is a higher chance that they may 
unknowingly reveal their private information or allow spyware to be installed on their 
computers. Therefore, there might be a positive relationship between the amount of 
content pirated and the privacy risk. Following similar argument, we expect that the 
more time consumers are connected to P2P networks, the higher the chance that their 
computers are infected by viruses and malware which in turn causes financial damage. 
Also, as the number of songs a consumer pirates increases, there is a higher chance that 
some of the files are polluted or the quality of pirated content is significantly lower 
than the original one. Therefore, there might be a positive relationship between the 
amount of content pirated and the financial and performance risk.  
66 
 
For legal online channels, a retailer usually provides a unified interface with 
effective search tools (e.g. music recommendation system). Compared to legal online 
sellers who have an incentive to provide better search tools, the process of obtaining 
content in P2P network usually involves more time to search relevant items and 
evaluate them. In addition, the amount of time to obtain content also varies depending 
on network congestion. Given the large volume of songs available, it is likely that 
consumers’ time loss risk will increase as the amount of content pirated increases.  
3.3.2.2 Piracy risk components not expected to change with the amount of content 
pirated 
 An individual’s social and psychological risk is related to her feelings of 
favorableness or aversion toward performing an action. An individual who believes 
that the action will lead to negative results will have unfavorable attitude toward the 
behavior, and the pirating behavior, will be perceived as being unethical once she 
violates the copyright law independent of the amount of content. Thus, it is unlikely 
that consumers’ social and psychological risk will change with the amount of content 
pirated. 
We also expect that as the amount of content pirated changes, the relative 
importance of each risk component may change as well. For example, in the case of 
pirating one song, the social risk may be the most important, but in the case of pirating 
many songs, the prosecution risk may become more important than the social risk. Due 
to lack of prior work and theoretical foundation, we also explore whether the relative 
importance of piracy risk components will change as the amount of content pirated 
changes.  
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3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Scale Development and Questionnaire Design 
 The consumer piracy risk construct shown in Figure 12 was tested using data 
collected from a questionnaire survey. A literature review was conducted to identify 
past operational measures of the constructs, and a group of questions were compiled to 
represent each risk component construct (Chiou, et al. 2005, Featherman and Pavlou 
2003, Stone and Gronhaug 1993, Tan 2002, Xu, et al. 2005). The wording was then 
modified to fit our context of illegal music downloads. Two different scenarios were 
developed: 1) pirating one song from file sharing programs and 2) pirating ten songs. 
The respondents were asked to indicate their assessment of the magnitude of their 
perceived risk. Each question was measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 
(1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. 
The questionnaire was tested extensively for validity before the actual survey 
was administered. As mentioned above, past operational measures were slightly 
modified to create the items used in the survey. While the use of previously developed 
constructs and items helps in developing a valid instrument, it does not ensure validity. 
Iterative review process was undertaken by four IS professionals to maximize content 
validity and identify ambiguous or poorly worded items. The 25 items were selected 
for the components of piracy risk, and were included on the survey instrument in a 
random order. Some items were reversed in order to establish internal consistency and 
to ensure that participants are consistent in their thinking and responses. The 
instrument was then pilot-tested to identify problems with the instrument’s wording, 
content, format, and procedures. For this pilot test, surveys were distributed to 54 
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students in a College of Business in a major university. Pilot respondents completed 
the survey and provided written comments about length, wording, and instructions. 
Based on the results of the pilot sample, further minor changes were made to the 
survey design. The final survey items for each construct are shown in the Table 12. 
 
Figure 12: Proposed second-order factor model of consumer piracy risk 
There are a number of variables that may influence the results of our survey. 
For example, studies have discussed the possibility of change in the attitude toward 
software piracy depending on prior computer experience or past purchase experience of 
pirated products (Kwong, et al. 2003, Siegfried 2004). Similarly, a high amount of file-
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sharing knowledge and experience may enable consumers to obtain illegal copies with 
little effort. In addition, consumer file-sharing experience may also affect the search 
cost because knowledge reduces the time and effort needed to locate an illegal copy. 
To deal with this issue, two questions were added at the end of the survey to obtain 
whether the subject has experience with file-sharing programs and if so, how long they 
have used file-sharing programs. We also collected other information such as gender 
and age to control their effects on the result. 
Table 12: Scenarios and construct measurement 
Scenario 1 (downloading a single song) 
While you were driving, you heard a song that you really like on a radio station. 
You decided to illegally download the song from peer-to-peer networks so that 
you could listen to it on your MP3 player or computer whenever needed. 
 
Scenario 2 (downloading multiple songs) 
Over the last few days, you heard 10 songs that you really like on a radio station. 
You decided to illegally download all songs from peer-to-peer networks (e.g. 
KaZaA, BitTorrent, LimeWire) so that you could listen to those on your MP3 
player or computer whenever needed 
Construct Items 
Social Risk 
1. Once my family, friends, and colleagues are aware that I have 
downloaded songs from file-sharing programs, I may lose 
their respect because they will think that I am unethical. (Tan 
2002) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may 
negatively affect the way others think of me. (Featherman 
and Pavlou 2003) 
3. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to a 
social loss for me because my friends, family, and colleagues 
will think less of me. (Featherman and Pavlou 2003) 
4. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may cause 
me to be thought of as being foolish by some people whose 
opinion I value. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
Prosecution 
Risk 
1. As I download songs, I worry that I will be caught for the 
infringement of copyright law. (Tan 2002) 
2. As I download songs, I worry that I will be punished for the 
infringement of copyright law. (Chiou, et al. 2005) 
3. As I download songs, I worry that I will have to pay a fine for 
the infringement of copyright law. (Tan 2002) 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Social Risk 
1. Once my family, friends, and colleagues are aware that I 
have downloaded songs from file-sharing programs, I may 
lose their respect because they will think that I am unethical. 
(Tan 2002) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may 
negatively affect the way others think of me. (Featherman 
and Pavlou 2003) 
3. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to 
a social loss for me because my friends, family, and 
colleagues will think less of me. (Featherman and Pavlou 
2003) 
4. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may cause 
me to be thought of as being foolish by some people whose 
opinion I value. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
Performance 
Risk 
1. As I download songs from file-sharing programs, I worry 
that the pirated songs will fail to play. (Tan 2002) 
2. As I download songs from file-sharing programs, I worry 
that the pirated songs will fail to play like the original one. 
(Tan 2002) 
3. As I download songs from file-sharing programs, I worry 
about whether the pirated songs will play as well as it is 
supposed to. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
4. As I download songs from file-sharing programs, I worry 
that the pirated songs will not provide the level of quality 
like a legitimate copy. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
Psychological 
Risk 
1. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs makes me 
feel psychologically uncomfortable. (Stone and Gronhaug 
1993) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs gives me a 
feeling of unwanted anxiety. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
3. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may cause 
me to experience unnecessary tension. (Stone and Gronhaug 
1993) 
4. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to 
a psychological loss for me because it will not fit in well 
with my self-image and self-concept. (Featherman and 
Pavlou 2003) 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Privacy 
Risk 
1. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs cause me a 
concern that I will lose control over the privacy of my 
information. (Featherman and Pavlou 2003) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to a 
loss of privacy for me because my personal information can 
be revealed without my knowledge. (Featherman and Pavlou 
2003) 
3. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to a 
loss of privacy for me because a hacker may access my 
personal information without my knowledge. (Xu, et al. 
2005) 
Financial 
Risk 
1. As I download songs from file-sharing programs, I worry 
that the pirated songs will cause damage to my computer due 
to viruses and malware resulting in a monetary loss (e.g. new 
hard drive, system re-installment, data recovery). (Tan 2002) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to a 
financial loss for me. (Featherman and Pavlou 2003) 
3. I may lose money as I use file-sharing programs to download 
songs. (Featherman and Pavlou 2003) 
Time 
Risk 
1. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may be a 
waste of time for me because it will take time to set up the 
required software (e.g. BitTorrent). (Featherman and Pavlou 
2003) 
2. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may be 
inconvenient for me because I will have to waste a lot of time 
to fix errors. (Featherman and Pavlou 2003) 
3. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs worries me 
that I will have to spend too much time learning how to 
download files. (Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
4. Downloading songs from file-sharing programs may lead to 
an inefficient use of my time for searching files, 
understanding various software packages, and so forth. 
(Stone and Gronhaug 1993) 
 
3.4.2 Sample 
 The subjects for the study are undergraduate business students in a major 
university. Students are considered good subjects for studying piracy since they are 
most likely to be engaged in pirating activities (Limayem, et al. 2004, Sims, et al. 
1996). Also, student subjects have been widely used in previous studies investigating 
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the impact of software/music piracy (Cheng, et al. 1997, Chiou, et al. 2005, Gopal, et 
al. 2004, Sims, et al. 1996, Sinha and Mandel 2008, Thong and Yap 1998).  
Table 13: Demographic information on subjects 
 Combined Single Song Multiple Songs 
Total Number of Subjects 510 252 258 
Gender 
Male 269 143 126 
Female 241 109 132 
Age 
10 – 20 131 60 71 
21 – 30 334 171 163 
31 – 40 34 16 18 
Above 40 11 5 6 
File Sharing 
Experience 
4
 
Yes 417 206 211 
No 60 30 30 
File Sharing 
Experience in 
Years 
Less than 1 year 88 42 46 
1 year – 2 year 68 29 39 
2 year – 3 year 59 30 29 
3 year – 4 year 52 26 26 
More than 4 years 150 84 66 
 
Students enrolled in Management Information Systems courses were asked to 
fill out the survey. One of the authors introduced the survey, and invited the students to 
take some time to complete the web-based survey at the end of the class. Java-script 
code was embedded in a web link to the survey so that participants were assigned to 
different scenarios randomly. Participation was entirely voluntary, and there was no 
penalty for non-participation. The subjects were allocated fifteen minutes to complete 
the questionnaire. Interactions were not allowed, and confidentiality of responses was 
emphasized again. In addition, the subject did not identify themselves on the 
                                                          
 
4
 Some participants did not provide the answers on whether and how long they have used file sharing 
programs. Therefore, the total number of subjects in those two items are different from the total number 
of subjects participated in the survey. 
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questionnaires so that they would be truthful in their responses with regard to this 
sensitive topic. Of 828 subjects, 510 subjects returned fully completed questionnaires, 
yielding a response rate of 61.6 percents. Table 13 provides descriptive statistics on the 
demographic profile of subjects. As the table shows, 52.7 percent of the respondents 
were male, and 91.2 percent of subjects were between the age of 10 and 30 years. 
Furthermore, 87.4 percent of the respondents have used file sharing programs where 
31.4 percent have more than 4 years of file sharing experience.  
3.5 DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
3.5.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 Principal Component Analysis with varimax rotation was used to test the initial 
survey items’ loading on the different factors. The criterion used in the analysis was a 
factor loading greater than 0.5, and Eigen values greater than 1.0 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2007). Most items loaded on their respective theorized constructs, but there were 
two cross-loading instances. In the first instance, the four items measuring social risk 
and three items measuring psychological risk were loaded on a single factor. To 
determine whether they are single or multiple constructs, we examined both the 
theoretical conceptualization as well as the empirical validation for the constructs of 
social and psychological risk used in prior IS research (Premkumar, et al. 1994). An 
independent factor analysis of the items measuring these two constructs showed that 
they loaded on one factor. Furthermore, previous study has suggested that the 
psychological risk may be correlated with other risks (Stone and Gronhaug 1993). 
Therefore, we decided to combine psychological and social risk into a single construct. 
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We name the new construct as moral-awareness risk, which refers to unfavorable 
perceptions from one’s social group as well as self-reflection.  
 In the second instance, three items measuring prosecution risk and the two 
items measuring financial risk were loaded on one factor. Although we could not find 
any literature supporting the connection between financial and prosecution risk, we 
suspect that consumers might perceive fines as the main legal penalty from pirating 
activities. Therefore, both financial and prosecution risks involve monetary loss, and 
consumers may perceive the two similarly. Nandedkar and Midha examined the 
perceived risk as four sub-constructs consisting of performance, financial, social, and 
prosecution risk. However, they dropped financial risk since the items did not load on 
the factor (Nandedkar and Midha 2009). Finally, we ran the independent factor analysis 
of the items measuring these two constructs and found that they loaded on one factor. 
Based on the arguments above, we decided to combine prosecution risk and financial 
risk into a single construct, and name it as monetary-loss risk, which refers to loss of 
money due to software re-installment, data recovery, or legal prosecution. The final 
results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 14. 
Table 14: Results of principal component factor analysis 
5
 
Construct Item 1 2 3 4 5 
Performance Risk 
PER1 0.74 
    
PER2 0.86 
    
PER3 0.85 
    
PER4 0.80 
    
 
                                                          
 
5
 One item in the psychological (PSY4) and financial risk (FIN2) were dropped since the factor loadings 
were less than 0.5 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Privacy Risk 
PRI1 
 
0.84 
   
PRI2 
 
0.85 
   
PRI3 
 
0.72 
   
Monetary-Loss 
Risk 
PRO1 
  
0.77 
  
PRO2 
  
0.75 
  
PRO3 
  
0.78 
  
FIN1 
  
0.57 
  
FIN3 
  
0.52 
  
Moral-Awareness 
Risk 
PSY1 
   
0.65 
 
PSY2 
   
0.66 
 
PSY3 
   
0.50 
 
SOC1 
   
0.85 
 
SOC2 
   
0.84 
 
SOC3 
   
0.78 
 
SOC4 
   
0.83 
 
Time Risk 
TIM1 
    
0.61 
TIM2 
    
0.66 
TIM3 
    
0.74 
TIM4 
    
0.76 
 
3.5.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 We checked normality, linearity and multi-collinearity using SPSS and LISREL, 
and found that the dataset violated multivariate normality assumption. Therefore, the 
research model was tested using partial least square (PLS), a component-based 
approach well suited for assessing complex predictive models. PLS is recommended 
when data has the normality problem (Chin 1998, Hsieh, et al. 2008). It is also a 
preferred technique to analyze formative constructs (Chin 1998). SmartPLS version 2.0 
(Ringle, et al. 2005) was used for the analysis.  
 The assessment of the measurement model includes the estimation of internal 
consistency for reliability, and tests of convergent and discriminant validity for 
construct validity. Internal consistency was evaluated by computing AVE (Average 
Variance Extracted), CR (Composite Reliability), and Cronbach's alpha (Hair, et al. 
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2005, Keil, et al. 2000). Factor loadings should be at least 0.6 and preferably greater 
than 0.7 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988, Fornell and Larcker 1981). Additionally, all AVE 
values of constructs should be higher than 0.5, the suggested minimum. As can be seen 
from Table 15, all reliability measures were well above the cut-off level, indicating 
adequate internal consistency. 
Table 15: Assessment of internal consistency 
Construct 
Number of 
Items 
AVE 
Composite  
Reliability 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Performance 4 0.72 0.91 0.87 
Privacy 3 0.77 0.91 0.85 
Monetary-Loss 5 0.59 0.88 0.83 
Moral-Awareness 7 0.67 0.93 0.92 
Time 4 0.63 0.87 0.80 
 
Table 16: Pair-wise correlations: Assessment of discriminant validity 
 
Performance Privacy 
Monetary-
Loss 
Moral-
Awareness 
Time 
Performance 0.85 
    
Privacy 0.40 0.88 
   
Monetary-Loss 0.29 0.49 0.77 
  
Moral-Awareness 0.28 0.38 0.59 0.82 
 
Time 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.79 
 
Discriminant validity was checked by examining whether the correlations 
between the variables are lower than the square root of the average variance extracted 
(Chin 1998, Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 16 shows that all the squared roots of 
AVEs on the main diagonal are greater than the pair-wise correlations between 
constructs on the off diagonal. This indicates discriminant validity among variables. In 
addition, we provide item cross-loading results in Table 17. Although some cross-
loadings are greater than 0.6 (e.g., MA6), the cross-loading difference is higher than 
the suggested threshold of 0.1 (Gefen and Straub 2005, Hsieh, et al. 2008). As a result, 
77 
 
there are no severe cross-loading problems, regarding discriminant validity. 
Convergent validity is demonstrated when the factor loading of an item on its 
designated construct is 0.6 or more (Chin, et al. 1997, Kim and Son 2009). As can be 
seen, all the items meet this requirement. We also conducted the analysis for sub-
samples (one song and multiple songs) separately, and found that the results are 
consistent.  
Table 17: Cross-loading: Assessment of convergent and discriminant validity 
 
Performance Privacy 
Monetary-
Loss 
Moral-
Awareness 
Time 
PER1 0.79 0.34 0.30 0.23 0.32 
PER2 0.86 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.32 
PER3 0.88 0.35 0.18 0.21 0.31 
PER4 0.86 0.37 0.28 0.28 0.42 
PRI1 0.30 0.86 0.36 0.29 0.38 
PRI2 0.33 0.87 0.40 0.27 0.36 
PRI3 0.42 0.90 0.49 0.42 0.50 
ML1 0.27 0.37 0.81 0.50 0.38 
ML2 0.20 0.24 0.62 0.28 0.21 
ML3 0.30 0.47 0.86 0.48 0.46 
ML4 0.12 0.38 0.77 0.48 0.38 
ML5 0.22 0.38 0.76 0.50 0.46 
MA1 0.20 0.24 0.38 0.80 0.40 
MA2 0.19 0.26 0.43 0.82 0.40 
MA3 0.26 0.30 0.46 0.85 0.51 
MA4 0.16 0.29 0.43 0.85 0.49 
MA5 0.29 0.35 0.55 0.81 0.50 
MA6 0.26 0.34 0.61 0.75 0.54 
MA7 0.21 0.37 0.52 0.83 0.57 
TIM1 0.32 0.42 0.42 0.48 0.78 
TIM2 0.40 0.41 0.36 0.46 0.79 
TIM3 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.50 0.76 
TIM4 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.84 
 
Following confirmation of acceptable properties in the first-order factors, we 
examined the second-order factor measurement model. The second-order factor 
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(overall piracy risk) is created using the indicators for all the first order factors. This 
repeated indicator approach, also known as the hierarchical component model, allows 
the model to be estimated using PLS algorithm (Wetzels, et al. 2009). It also allows 
examining the path weights of factors forming the higher order construct to examine 
the relative importance (Chin and Gopal 1995, Chwelos, et al. 2001). The bootstrap re-
sampling method (1000 re-samples) was used to determine the significance of the paths 
between the first-order and the second-order factors.  
Table 18: PLS path weight 
Combined 
 
Path 
Weight 
Standard 
Error 
t-value Significance 
Moral-Awareness – Overall 0.461 0.016 29.598 
p < 0.001 
Monetary-Loss – Overall 0.266 0.012 22.087 
Time – Overall 0.227 0.008 27.123 
Performance – Overall 0.178 0.014 12.737 
Privacy – Overall 0.172 0.009 18.777 
Single Song 
 
Path 
Weight 
Standard 
Error 
t-value Significance 
Moral-Awareness – Overall 0.452 0.017 26.568 
p < 0.001 
Monetary-Loss – Overall 0.253 0.014 17.787 
Time – Overall 0.226 0.011 20.820 
Performance – Overall 0.177 0.018 10.026 
Privacy – Overall 0.153 0.011 14.201 
Multiple Songs 
 
Path 
Weight 
Standard 
Error 
t-value Significance 
Moral-Awareness – Overall 0.471 0.029 16.509 
p < 0.001 
Monetary-Loss – Overall 0.284 0.019 14.719 
Time – Overall 0.226 0.014 16.571 
Privacy – Overall 0.198 0.016 12.287 
Performance – Overall 0.176 0.023 7.503 
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As shown in Table 18, it is found that all five components are significant (p < 
0.001) in the combined sample, one song, and multiple songs. This indicates that 
moral-awareness, performance, piracy, monetary-loss, and time risk are significant 
components constituting the consumer piracy risk. We also found that moral-awareness 
risk is the most important dimension explaining the overall consumer piracy risk in all 
three scenarios followed by monetary-loss, time, performance, and prosecution risk.  
To explore the relationship between the amount of content pirated and 
consumer piracy risk, we first compared the weights between sub-constructs and 
second-order latent construct for one song with the corresponding weight in multiple 
songs. This statistical comparison was carried out using the following procedure 
suggested by Chin (Chin 1998, Keil, et al. 2000, Qureshi and Compeau 2009). 
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where 
 t = t-statistic with None + Nmultiple – 2 degrees of freedom 
 N = sample size 
 SE = standard error of path 
 PW = path weight  
As can be seen in Table 19, we found a significant path weight increase in the 
privacy risk (p < .01) and a marginal increase in the monetary-loss risk (p < .10). These 
results suggest that, as the amount of content pirated increases, the relative importance 
of privacy and monetary-loss risks increases. In other words, when consumers pirate 
multiple songs, they put more weight on the loss of confidential information and the 
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monetary loss in their risk evaluation process.  
Table 19: Differences in the path weight estimates 
 One song Multiple songs t-value Significance 
Privacy – Overall 0.153 0.198 2.347 p < 0.01 
Monetary-Loss – Overall 0.253 0.284 1.292 p < 0.10 
Moral-Awareness – Overall 0.452 0.471 0.567 N/S 
Time – Overall 0.226 0.226 -0.017 N/S 
Performance – Overall 0.177 0.176 -0.061 N/S 
 
Next, we examine the relationship between the amount of content pirated and 
consumer piracy risk (in terms of magnitude) by comparing the survey responses of the 
two different scenarios. Latent variable scores (weighted average over the indicators of 
its components) for each risk component as well as overall risk were obtained in PLS 
analysis, and used to test whether the means of two groups are statistically different 
from each other. For two group comparison, both the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test 
were used, and for multiple groups, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the Kruskal-
Wallis test were used. Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis are non-parametric tests for 
assessing two or more group differences when the distribution is non-normal and/or the 
equal variance is not assumed (Gravetter and Wallnau 2004). As seen in Table 20, the 
means for pirating multiple songs were slightly higher than pirating one song in most 
cases. However, the differences were not statistically significant for the all risk 
components. This result indicates that the magnitude of consumers’ piracy risk does 
not change with the amount of content pirated, thus piracy risk cost in a session is fixed 
(consumers assign the same risk cost regardless of the number of songs pirated).  
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Table 20: Group differences in two scenarios 
Construct Scenario Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t-test Mann-Whitney 
t p Z p 
Performance 
One 2.98 1.02 
-0.99 0.49 -0.66 0.51 
Multiple 3.07 0.93 
Privacy 
One 3.27 0.93 
0.39 0.32 -0.40 0.69 
Multiple 3.23 0.96 
Monetary-
Loss 
One 2.73 0.92 
-0.18 0.70 -0.04 0.97 
Multiple 2.73 0.88 
Moral-
Awareness 
One 2.06 0.88 
-0.99 0.99 -1.35 0.18 
Multiple 2.14 0.82 
Time 
One 2.45 0.94 
-0.51 0.32 -0.70 0.49 
Multiple 2.49 0.85 
Overall 
One 2.53 0.73 
-0.69 0.61 -1.19 0.24 
Multiple 2.58 0.64 
 
We also compare the mean differences in gender, age, file sharing experience 
(Y/N), and file sharing experience in years. The results show that females tend to 
perceive significantly higher risk than males, older individuals tend to perceive higher 
risk than younger individuals, and no (or less) file sharing experience individuals tend 
to perceive higher risk than more file sharing experience individuals (Table 21 - 24). 
Table 21: Group differences in gender 
Construct Gender Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t-test Mann-Whitney 
T p Z p 
Overall 
Male 2.47 0.71 
-2.66 0.01 -3.06 0.00 
Female 2.63 0.64 
Performance 
Male 2.91 1.00 
-2.89 0.01 -2.67 0.01 
Female 3.16 0.92 
Privacy 
Male 3.15 0.99 
-2.25 0.03 -2.25 0.02 
Female 3.34 0.87 
Monetary-
Loss 
Male 2.63 0.93 
-2.57 0.01 -2.64 0.01 
Female 2.83 0.85 
Moral-
Awareness 
Male 2.06 0.88 
-0.84 0.40 -1.21 0.23 
Female 2.12 0.81 
Time 
Male 2.35 0.85 
-3.02 0.00 -3.08 0.00 
Female 2.58 0.90 
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Table 22: Group differences in file sharing experience (Y/N) 
Construct 
Sharing 
Experience 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t-test Mann-Whitney 
t p Z p 
Overall 
Yes 2.42 0.63 
-7.04 0.00 -6.18 0.00 
No 3.04 0.70 
Performance 
Yes 2.99 0.99 
-0.90 0.37 -0.76 0.45 
No 3.11 0.94 
Privacy 
Yes 3.17 0.93 
-2.29 0.02 -1.96 0.05 
No 3.47 0.92 
Monetary-
Loss 
Yes 2.62 0.88 
-4.79 0.00 -4.91 0.00 
No 3.19 0.78 
Moral-
Awareness 
Yes 1.94 0.74 
-7.68 0.00 -6.08 0.00 
No 2.76 0.99 
Time 
Yes 2.32 0.83 
-6.91 0.00 -6.37 0.00 
No 3.11 0.85 
 
Table 23: Group differences in age 
Construct Age Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis 
F p χ
2
 p 
Overall 
10-20 2.53 0.60 
5.55 0.00 12.99 0.01 
21-30 2.51 0.69 
31-40 2.86 0.77 
Above 40 3.16 0.72 
Performance 
10-20 3.15 0.94 
2.27 0.08 5.59 0.13 
21-30 2.97 0.99 
31-40 2.96 0.89 
Above 40 3.58 0.68 
Privacy 
10-20 3.19 0.86 
0.85 0.47 2.69 0.44 
21-30 3.25 0.93 
31-40 3.38 0.97 
Above 40 3.60 1.20 
Monetary-
Loss 
10-20 2.73 0.88 
3.73 0.01 10.59 0.01 
21-30 2.67 0.89 
31-40 3.12 0.96 
Above 40 3.22 0.60 
Moral-
Awareness 
10-20 2.04 0.72 
6.46 0.00 12.58 0.01 
21-30 2.05 0.84 
31-40 2.55 1.04 
Above 40 2.8 1.19 
Time 
10-20 2.44 0.85 
3.47 0.02 9.07 0.03 
21-30 2.43 0.89 
31-40 2.76 0.95 
Above 40 3.15 0.87 
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Table 24: Group differences in file sharing experience in years 
Construct 
Sharing 
Time 
(year) 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
F p χ
2
 p 
Overall 
> 1 2.74 0.61 
10.27 0.00 41.15 0.00 
1 - 2 2.65 0.59 
2 - 3 2.40 0.59 
3 - 4 2.31 0.56 
< 4 2.28 0.65 
Performance 
> 1 3.12 0.90 
1.43 0.22 5.16 0.27 
1 - 2 3.07 0.80 
2 - 3 3.03 0.99 
3 - 4 3.01 1.07 
< 4 2.84 1.05 
Monetary-
Loss 
> 1 2.96 0.81 
8.16 0.00 31.52 0.00 
1 - 2 2.94 0.89 
2 - 3 2.57 0.90 
3 - 4 2.53 0.83 
< 4 2.39 0.89 
Moral-
Awareness 
> 1 2.22 0.74 
6.36 0.00 28.92 0.00 
1 - 2 2.17 0.84 
2 - 3 1.96 0.65 
3 - 4 1.78 0.64 
< 4 1.81 0.76 
Privacy 
> 1 3.46 0.89 
3.24 0.01 12.42 0.02 
1 - 2 3.28 0.99 
2 - 3 3.05 0.86 
3 - 4 3.04 0.96 
< 4 3.08 0.95 
Social 
> 1 2.75 0.84 
10.12 0.00 38.87 0.00 
1 - 2 2.58 0.79 
2 - 3 2.22 0.71 
3 - 4 2.18 0.81 
< 4 2.15 0.83 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This paper contributes to the literature on digital piracy by addressing two main 
issues. First, drawing upon prior research on perceived risk theory, we extend and 
support the notion of consumer piracy risk as a multi-dimensional construct formed by 
performance, time, privacy, moral-awareness, and monetary-loss risk. The multi-
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dimensional conceptualization we propose offers detailed information about the 
structure of consumer piracy risk and the relative importance of each risk component. 
From managerial perspective, understanding different components of consumers' 
piracy risk is critical since it has many important implications for pricing and piracy 
control strategies. For example, we found that moral-awareness risk is the most 
important risk component explaining the overall consumer piracy risk. Based on this 
finding, educational strategy can be particularly effective in increasing consumer’s 
moral-awareness risk. Record labels can design and deliver public campaigns that 
attempt to educate and inform consumers about the risks and the negative social impact 
of piracy. Through this educational strategy to control piracy, the music industry can 
encourage consumers to think critically (or increase psychological or social discomfort) 
about how they acquire music, and motivate consumers’ attitude changes. 
Second, many piracy acts may involve pirating more than one song in a session, 
but it has been unclear whether consumer piracy risk is increasing in the amount of 
content pirated or fixed. Our findings suggest that although the relative importance of 
monetary-loss and privacy risks increases with the amount of content pirated, 
consumers’ overall piracy risk does not change with the amount of content pirated in a 
session suggesting that consumers’ risk cost is in fact fixed. The implications of fixed 
piracy risk cost where more than one song is pirated in a single session have profound 
impact on pricing and profitability of the music industry. One study demonstrated that 
the magnitude of a digital experience goods supply chain profit loss is related to the 
type of piracy risk costs (Jeong, et al. 2010b). If consumers' piracy risk cost is fixed 
and relativly low, the supply chain suffers more from the fixed piracy cost than the 
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linear cost case. As our prior numerical example indicates, the more songs a consumer 
is interested, the more likely she will pirate under fixed piracy costs. Therefore, when 
the piracy risk cost is fixed, popular songs and/or artists suffer more from piracy. For 
popular artists, a more drastic solution to the problem of piracy should be considered 
such as a subscription model that is less vulnerable to piracy while encouraging 
legitimate sales. 
Our study has several limitations as well as potential avenues for future 
research. First, the use of undergraduate students is appropriate and convenient for 
testing our model, but the results may have limited generalizability. Therefore, the 
external validity of this study needs to be verified by testing the proposed model to 
other populations. Similarly, different scenarios should be tested to validate the 
relationship between the amount of content pirated and piracy risk. In this study, we 
developed two scenarios by choosing “pirating one song vs. ten songs”. However, 
subjects may not perceive much difference in terms of the numbers that we selected. 
Also, it would be interesting to examine how and to what extent different anti-piracy 
strategies (educational campaigns and law-suits) influence different components of 
piracy risk.  
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CHAPTER 4: EFFECTIVE PIRACY CONTROL STRATEGIES: AN AGENT-
BASED MODELING APPROACH 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The prevalence of unauthorized copying and dissemination has been a serious 
threat in the music industry. For example, the rapid developments of compression and 
file-sharing technologies as well as the decreasing cost of copying mediums have 
provided consumers with greater access to free music than ever before. According to 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), more than 40 billion files 
were illegally shared in 2008, and P2P file sharing accounts for approximately 80 
percent of traffic volumes on Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks (IFPI 2009). 
In an attempt to protect intellectual property and increase legitimate sales, 
record companies, often working with the government, have employed numerous anti-
piracy strategies including innovation, education, and enforcement. Despite various 
piracy control efforts, there is little evidence that these policies have successfully 
decreased piracy levels (Sinha and Mandel 2008). Legal actions initiated by the music 
industry have been shutting down some of the most well-known file sharing websites 
such as Napster. However, the traffic volume of P2P sites does not decrease 
significantly even after the legal threats, and the total number of files shared continue 
to increase (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006a). Also, even with the clear articulation of digital 
copyright law and educational deterrence efforts, piracy is still prevalent due to the 
high cost of increasing consumers' awareness and of enforcing the law.  
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 The objectives of this paper are to 1) provide an alternative methodology for 
analyzing the effectiveness of piracy control strategies, 2) find good piracy control and 
pricing strategies in a market where some piracy is unavoidable, and 3) investigate the 
impact of different piracy control strategies on consumers, retailers, record labels, and 
artists. The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents theoretical background 
by offering a review of the literature on piracy control strategies, and introduces Agent-
Based Modeling (ABM) and its use in problem solving. In Section 4.3, we develop an 
agent-based model for analyzing the effectiveness of different piracy control strategies. 
In Section 4.4, we present the results from simulation experiments. Section 4.5 
concludes with summary of findings and suggestions for future research. 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 Piracy Control Strategies 
 Piracy can be reduced using preventive or deterrent measures (Gopal and 
Sanders 1997). Preventive controls refer to the provision of additional benefits to 
legitimate consumers and/or the use of hardware and software technology to prevent 
piracy. Prior studies suggest that additional benefits offered are important to 
encouraging consumers to engage in long-term relationships, and satisfied customers 
are less likely to pirate (Chiu, et al. 2008a, Chiu, et al. 2008b). In the context of digital 
piracy, companies can enhance consumers’ use of legal products and turn them into 
loyal customers through lower-price and value-added product strategy such as 
personalized recommendation and customization. Additional preventive strategies use 
technology to prevent unauthorized reproduction of digital music files. Examples of 
protection methods include Digital Right Management (DRM), encryption, and digital 
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watermarks. However, technological preventive controls have often had limited 
success, and imposed unfair restrictions on what legitimate consumers can do with the 
songs they have bought. Also, there is little evidence that preventive technology 
reduces piracy (Sinha and Mandel 2008, Stone 2009).  
Deterrent controls refer to the use of education and legal campaigns and 
sanctions to reduce piracy. Deterrent controls attempt to dissuade users from copying 
digital products by disseminating litigious information about piracy to the public 
(Gopal and Sanders 1997). In the music industry, the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA) coordinates anti-piracy efforts such as educational campaigns and 
lawsuits against pirates and the operators of P2P networks. Several studies have been 
conducted to investigate the impact of deterrent controls on piracy in digital good 
industries. For example, Gopal et al. (2004) demonstrated that the level of music piracy 
was not significantly affected by a deterrent information message. However, they 
propose that the results are due to the difficulty of delivering deterrent information 
through imaginary scenarios such as the one used in their survey (Gopal, et al. 2004). 
Another interesting finding by Gopal and Sanders (1997) is that deterrent controls that 
employ educational and legal campaigns provide more profits to the publisher than 
preventive controls that use technology. Also, deterrent controls are shown to be 
superior with respect to a social welfare (Gopal and Sanders 1997). 
An empirical study on consumer ethics by Levin et al. (2004) showed that 
illegal downloaders are less likely to believe that their behavior harms the publisher or 
the artist, which is an indication that the music industry has not been successful in 
educating consumers on the real economic impact of piracy on the music industry 
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(Levin, et al. 2004). In a follow up to their 1997 study, Gopal and Sanders (1998) 
studied individuals’ ethical behavior toward piracy. The justice construct, which 
explains ethical predisposition of individuals toward the legal and justice system, is 
shown to have a significant impact on the level of piracy regardless of ethical and 
cultural differences (Gopal and Sanders 1998). Given these findings, we may argue that 
piracy prevails unless appropriate piracy control strategies are set up to influence 
consumer behavior. Four generic strategies to combat digital piracy are identified based 
on the literature: low-price strategy, legal strategy, educational strategy, and value-
added service strategy. In the following, we discuss each strategy in further details. 
4.2.1.1 Low-price Strategy 
 Low-price strategy is defined as lowering the price to encourage consumers to 
buy legal products rather than pirate. Prior studies suggest that price is a primary 
determinant that influences consumers’ purchase and piracy decision. For example, 
Chiu et al. (2008) show that the low-price strategy has a positive impact on purchase 
intentions for legitimate online music and software (Chiu, et al. 2008a, Chiu, et al. 
2008b). A record label can take advantage of the low production, packaging, inventory, 
and distribution cost of digital products to decrease price, and thereby reduce 
consumers’ incentive to pirate. If record companies adopt a low-price strategy, 
consumers have greater motivation to buy legitimate online music rather than pirate it. 
4.2.1.2 Legal Strategy 
 The legal strategy is defined as the actions that music industry takes against 
pirates and antipiracy regulations or laws by the government. In the past, the RIAA 
issued threats only to the operators of P2P networks, and have been successful in 
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shutting down some well-known file sharing websites. Recently, the music industry has 
redirected legal actions and threats toward individual users of P2P networks, and they 
have filed well-publicized lawsuits in which violators of copyright laws were subject to 
fines and potential jail time. According to the Wall Street Journal, more than 35,000 
people have been sued for illegal music sharing since September 2003 (McBride and 
Smith 2008).  
Legal actions are likely to influence customer intentions to buy legitimate 
products. The legal prosecution risk resulting from acquiring pirated products is 
considered a significant factor in predicting intention to pirate (Chiou, et al. 2005, Tan 
2002). Also, there is an inverse relationship between the perceived severity of 
punishment and willingness to buy pirated goods (Albers-Miller, 1999). However, the 
impact of legal action against pirates tends to be limited. Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) 
examined how individuals actually responded to legal threats from the recording 
industry. The authors tracked the file sharing behavior of 2,056 individuals before and 
after RIAA related legal actions, and found that the majority of substantial sharers as 
well as non-substantial shares in P2P sites decreased the number of files they shared 
after the RIAA’s legal actions. But, they found an upsurge in the frequency of usage 
after some time period from the file sharers who continue to use the file-sharing 
network (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006a). This result suggests that consumers’ response to 
the music industry’s legal threats is temporary and sometime after the legal threats, the 
level of file sharing and the availability of music files quickly bounce back and remain 
substantial. 
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4.2.1.3 Educational Strategy 
 The educational strategy involves the music industry disseminating information 
to consumers about the risks involved in illegal music downloads and the damage 
piracy causes (Chiu, et al. 2008b, Shultz and Saporito 1996). The record companies 
have designed and delivered public campaigns that attempt to educate and inform 
consumers that illegal music downloading activities harm recording artists and/or 
music companies. Through this educational approach, the record companies encourage 
consumers to think critically about how they acquire music and other forms of 
intellectual property. If the music industry continues to inform consumers about the 
risks of illegal music download and the benefits (better service, quality, and guarantees) 
that legal products can provide with good success, it may motivate consumers’ attitude 
changes about appropriate copying behavior.  
4.2.1.4 Value-Added Service Strategy 
 A value-added service strategy is defined as the provision of added value or 
extended services to encourage consumers to purchase legal products (Gopal and 
Sanders 1997). Studies have shown that additional services that online music retailers 
offer such as personalized recommendation, customization, and reward programs 
provide great benefits to consumers, and encourage consumers to engage in long-term 
relationships with music retailers (Chiu, et al. 2008a, Chiu, et al. 2008b). Therefore, the 
value-added product strategy can enhance purchase intentions for legitimate music.  
4.2.2 Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) 
 Agent-based modeling is a simulation technique. Simulations can be used in 
situations where 1) not a significant amount of empirical research has been done – it 
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allows the researcher to understand key variables and focus future research effort; 2) it 
is difficult to collect real-life data on particular phenomena; 3) it is hard to dissociate 
inter-related or confounding factors from the ones that the researcher is interested in 
studying (Khouja, et al. 2008). It is true that simulation poses the question of reliability 
of results since researchers end up generating their own data (based on some theoretical 
foundations). However, the simulation gives greater control and flexibility in analyzing 
different situations.  
ABM can be applied to a problem by defining a set of agents with related 
characteristics (attributes), operations (behaviors) and fitness function (performance 
measuring function). The agents are defined in context of a simulated environment or 
system and certain overall performance-measuring parameters for the system are 
identified as well. The entities in the system are modeled as agents whose behavior 
mimics that of the real entities. Agents act according to their rules/schema. Agents in 
ABMs can have a high degree of heterogeneity or be very similar depending on the 
nature of the system being modeled. There can be heterogeneity across the types of 
agents being modeled (e.g. consumers, firms, nations etc) as well as within each type 
of agent (e.g. consumers of different types based on their attributes and behaviors). 
Over time, as a result of repeated actions and interactions of the agents, an aggregate 
behavior of the system emerges that may not have been originally programmed into the 
behavior of any of the individual agents (Twomey and Cadman 2002). At times the 
agents will act independently of each other while on other occasions they may 
collaborate or compete with each other in pursuit of their individual goals. What is 
important is that our objective to study systems, usually involving some form of social 
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interaction, is to understand the collective through an investigation of the behavior of 
individuals. This has now become possible due to increased computing power 
(Srbljinovic and Skunca 2003).  
Several advantages of using ABM have been given in the literature. While these 
advantages may not be unique to ABM, their combination makes this method 
attractive. ABM does not require assumptions with regard to the behavior of the system 
(Twomey and Cadman 2002). Agents also provide a useful approach for modeling 
entities in many social problems (Bankes 2002). The use of ABM enables us to use the 
wealth of information about agents’ behavior, motives, and interactions to examine the 
consequences in terms of aggregate system behavior. As mentioned earlier, agents also 
provide a method for modeling heterogeneity, which is a key characteristic of 
consumers (Twomey and Cadman 2002). Agents are autonomous entities with limited 
perception of their environment. They are guided by a few simple rules and act locally. 
They may or may not have the history of their previous interactions and the ability to 
learn from them. At times information about past performance is used by agents to 
determine the type and the degree of improvement in their behavior. 
4.3 AGENT-BASED MODELING AND OPTIMAL PIRACY CONTROL 
 In applying agent-based modeling, one must first identify the agents in the 
system and their rules. Agents in this problem include online retailers, record labels, 
artists, consumers, and government. The following assumptions are made: 
1. There is only one retailer, record label, and artist. 
2. The objective of the retailer, the record label, and the artist is to maximize  
 their profits over the life of the product. 
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3. The objective of the consumers is to maximize their utility. 
4. Consumers have complete information about the current price. 
The following notation is used: 
 t  = 1, 2,  , T , a period index, 
 i  = 1, 2,  , N , a consumer index,  
 ti
y ,  = scale of the utility function associated with consumer i  in time period t , 
 ti ,
  =
 shape of the utility function associated with consumer i  in time period t , 
 ti ,

 
=  number of songs consumer i  is interested in obtaining in time period t , 
  tiz , = risk cost consumer i  attaches to piracy in time period t , 
 t
p  = retail price per song in time period t ,
 
 ti ,
  = probability that consumer i  is aware of the legal actions in time period t ,
 
 t
n  = the number of anti-piracy legal actions in time period t , 
tiq ,  = probability that consumer i  is exposed to anti-piracy educational 
campaign in time period t ,
 
 t
m  = the number of anti-piracy educational-campaigns in time period t , 
 ,    = constants denoting effectiveness of the legal and educational 
campaigns, 10    and 10   , 
 t
  = degree of anti-piracy social pressure in time period t ,
 
 M = percentage markup from wholesale price, 
 t
w = wholesale price per song in time period t , 
 t
  = total number of songs sold in time period t ( 


N
i
itt
1
 ), 
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 r = royalty rate for artist, 
 
tI ,  total investment in anti-piracy legal actions in time period t , 
   
cost of each anti-piracy law-suit, 
 
tqI ,  total investment in anti-piracy educational campaigns in time period t , 
   
cost of each anti-piracy educational campaign, 
   
value-added effect,   
 
c  = cost of implementing value-added service, 
 rc  = retailer’s variable cost per song. 
 All variables indexed by t  are dynamic in terms of potentially having a 
different value each period. For simplicity, we omit the subscript t  in the following 
discussion. 
4.3.1 Consumer schema 
 There are N consumers and all have complete information about the current 
selling price. At the beginning of each period, a consumer i is interested in obtaining μi 
number of songs. Similar to the study by Khouja and Wang (Khouja and Wang 2010), 
we assume that the consumer's valuation for songs is a non-decreasing concave 
function in the number of songs purchased indicating that the marginal valuation is 
diminishing in the number of songs purchased. This is a realistic assumption because 
consumers can buy their favorite songs first when using online stores. A consumer i’s 
valuation for μi songs is given by: 
i
iii yV
=  
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 The consumer valuation function above implies that consumers have different 
valuations for songs and these valuations diminish at a different rate. We assume that 
iy  and i  
are normally distributed with known mean and standard deviation, and 
i  
is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. However, the system can deal with any 
known distribution. Figure 13 illustrates different consumer valuation functions with 
respect to y and  . 
 
Figure 13: Consumer’s valuation for songs 
 Consumers can obtain songs either by purchasing legitimate copies or by 
pirating them. While consumers can get songs for free (or at a negligible cost) if they 
pirate, they are subject to piracy costs caused by potential penalties for violating 
copyright if they are caught, moral costs of pirating, and search costs to identify and 
download pirated copies (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006b, Chellappa and Shivendu 2003a, 
Chellappa and Shivendu 2005). Therefore, each consumer may purchase some quantity, 
pirate some quantity, or do nothing depending on which action maximizes her utility. 
One study has demonstrated that when a consumer pirates a single or multiple songs, 
the risk cost is only associated with the act. In other words, once a consumer violates 
copyright law, she perceives the penalty to be fixed (Jeong, et al. 2010a). Therefore, we 
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assume that the risk cost consumer i  attaches to piracy is a normally distributed 
random variable, iz , and independent of the number of songs pirated in a piracy 
session. Consumers’ piracy risk cost is affected by the type of piracy control strategies 
used. In the following section, we discuss the impact of piracy control strategies on 
consumer risk assessment process in further details.  
4.3.1.1 Legal strategy
 
 Consumers’ value/risk assessment process is updated at the end of each period 
(or beginning of next period) due to the actions implemented by the record label. Each 
time there is a legal action, consumer i has a probability of i  of becoming aware of 
the law-suit. The probability of awareness depends on the expenditure that music 
industry spends to make consumers aware of the legal actions. We assume that i  
is a 
non-decreasing concave function in the number of legal action indicating that the 
marginal awareness is diminishing with the total number of legal actions.  


ni e
1
1= 
 
where   is a constant, satisfying 10  , which represents the effectiveness of legal 
campaigns. To determine if consumer i is aware of the legal action, a random variable 
is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], and if the number is less than i , we 
assume that the consumer is aware of the legal actions, otherwise unaware. Different 
responses are expected depending on whether consumers are aware/unaware of the 
law-suits. For consumers who are aware of legal actions, their piracy risk cost, iz , will 
increase at a certain rate. A previous study has shown that while the law-suits 
successfully reduce a number of sharers as well as files shared, P2P traffic volume 
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quickly bounce back after the legal actions (Bhattacharjee, et al. 2006a). Based on this 
result, we assume that the impact of the legal strategy on consumers’ piracy risk costs 
is temporary (short-lived), thus the risk cost will decrease and eventually go back to the 
initial level if consumers do not become aware of any new legal actions in the next 
period. 
4.3.1.2 Educational strategy
 
 For educational strategy, consumer i has a probability of iq  of becoming aware 
of the educational campaign. The probability, iq , also depends on the expenditure that 
music industry invests in educating consumers, and assumed to be a non-decreasing 
concave function in the number of educational-campaigns.  
mi e
q
1
1=   
where   is a constant, satisfying 10   , which represents the effectiveness of 
educational campaigns. Similarly, a random variable is drawn from a uniform 
distribution on [0, 1] to determine if consumer i is aware of the educational campaign, 
and if the number is less than iq , we assume that the consumer is aware of the 
educational campaigns, otherwise unaware. Educational campaign may have less 
impact in terms of reducing the magnitude of consumer piracy risk. However, unlike 
the legal strategy, their effect on consumers’ piracy risk will not diminish with time. 
This is a realistic assumption because educational campaigns teach consumers about 
copyright laws and motivate permanent attitude changes about appropriate copying 
behavior. Once consumers’ attitude toward piracy change, it is likely that this change 
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becomes permanent. Figure 14 highlights the temporal difference of the impact of legal 
and educational strategy on consumer piracy risk cost. 
 
Figure 14: Impact of piracy control strategies on consumers’ piracy risk 
4.3.1.3 Value-added service and Low-price strategy 
 Value-added service strategy and low-price strategy encourage consumers to 
buy legal products and reduce consumers’ incentive to pirate. When the value-added 
service strategy is implemented, we assume that consumers’ valuation for purchasing 
legitimate songs will increase by adjusting   (value-added effect) using  
i
iii yV
 =  
 We consider three different levels of value-added services; standard (5%), 
upgrade (10%), and premium (15%). For example, premium value-added services can 
offer personalized user interface and recommendation, flexibility of use (ability to store 
and duplicate songs in different systems), and technical support. Costs involved in 
implementing different levels of value-added services are bc (basic), uc (upgrade), pc
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(premium), respectively where pub ccc   . For the low-price strategy, we assume 
the record label will reduce the current wholesale price (w) by a certain percent. 
4.3.1.4 Other factor 
 In addition to the individual’s risk cost, we also consider the impact of social 
(external) pressure on consumers’ risk assessment process. Social norm or social 
pressure has a significant impact on an individual’s behavioral intention (d’Astous, et 
al. 2005). For example, if most consumers (neighbors) purchase songs legally rather 
than pirate, it will also affect one’s purchase/pirate decision. We use   to represent the 
intensity (degree) of social pressure on music piracy which is calculated:  
  
size of pirating segment (a number of consumers who pirate)
a total number of consumers
 
 If   is high (most consumers pirate), more weight is assigned to the net gain 
from pirating songs so that the degree of social acceptance (consensus) for the practice 
of music piracy can be reflected in individual risk assessment process.  
 Based on the discussion of consumer utility function, risk cost assessment, and 
the effect of piracy control strategies, consumer i  will purchase   songs if the gain 
from purchasing them is positive and greater than the net gain from pirating, i.e., 
)())(1( iiiiii zypy
ii 
   and 0))(1(  py iii
i    
4.3.2 Record label schema 
 The per song contract is currently the most common contract type in the music 
industry. Under this contract, a retailer pays the record a wholesale price for each song 
sold. Studies have shown that the retailer's margin per song is quite small since the 
wholesale price averages about $ 0.70 (Chen and Png 2003). The record label chooses 
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the wholesale price before the online retailer sets the retail price. The record label 
charges a wholesale price per song sold of w  and incurs a marginal cost. The royalty 
per song paid to the artist is the major component of the marginal cost incurred by the 
record label. Also, the record label incurs costs due to investments in law-suits ( I ) 
and educational campaigns ( qI ). In this scenario, the record label's profit is 
Record label’s profit =  cIIprw q  )(  
where 
nI    
and mIq   
wMp )1(   
4.3.3 Other agents’ schema 
 While the retailer and the artists are simple agents in our model, we incorporate 
these agents to examine how different piracy control strategies also affect on their 
profitability. The retailer's profit and the artist’s royalty are calculated as follows: 
Retailer’s profit =  rcMw   
Artist’s royalty = wrM )1(   
The royalty rate is usually negotiated as a percentage of prices before an artist 
signs a contract. If the artist and the monopolist try to reach a point where both parties 
agree, the negotiated royalty rate would represent a fair rate based on each party’s 
negotiation power (e.g. the popularity of the artist and the investment needed by the 
record label). Therefore, creators focus mainly on obtaining the best royalty rate. 
Studies show that artists are paid royalties usually somewhere between 8% and 25%.  
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4.4 ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 The system was developed using NetLogo 4.1 – a multi-agent programmable 
modeling environment for simulating natural and social phenomena. Several 
experiments were conducted to test the system and develop managerial insights. The 
parameter values used in the simulation are summarized in Table 25, and Appendix C 
illustrates the flow of the simulation. 
Table 25: Parameters for the experiment 
Parameter Value 
Market size 1,000 consumers 
Valuation for songs ( tiy , ) N ~ (1, 1), tiy , ≥ 0 
Valuation decrease rate (
ti , ) U ~ (0.5, 0.8) 
Number of songs ( ti , ) N ~ (3, 1), 0N   
Piracy risk costs ( tiz , ) N ~ (2, 0.5), , 0i tz   
Retailer’s margin ( M ) 0.15, 0.25, 0.35 
Royalty rate ( r ) 0.10, 0.15, 0.20 
Effectiveness of law-suits ( ) 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 
Effectiveness of educational campaigns ( ) 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 
Cost of implementing value-added service ( pub ccc  ,, ) 5, 10, 20 
Retailer’s marginal cost ( rc ) $0.2 
Cost of legal action (  ) 
6
 $23 
Cost of educational campaign ( ) $23 
 
 For each of the parameter combinations, simulation was run for 50 time periods 
with 5 repetitions. We identified the best law-suits and educational campaigns 
investment amount in terms of maximizing profits of the record label. We also 
identified the profits of the retailer, and artist, and the number of consumers who 
                                                          
 
6 A study by Wan (2010) shows that the average net cost of law-suit is approximately $2,300.  
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purchased, pirated, or neither to compare the effectiveness of different piracy control 
strategies. We assume that the cost of each anti-piracy legal action ( ) and educational 
campaign (  ) is same. Simulations were computationally intensive and were run on a 
Linux-based cluster which had 200 CPU cluster blade servers, Intel Xeon CPUs and 
gigabit Ethernet interconnections with 2TBs of dedicated network attached storage. 
Table 26: Effectiveness of law-suit investments 
# of 
Law-suit 
Investment 
Amount 
Label 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
Artist 
Profit 
Total Chain 
Profit 
0 $0 $48.09 $48.91 $6.25 $103.25 
1 $23 $25.42 $59.75 $7.63 $92.80 
2 $46 $23.34 $91.53 $11.70 $126.56 
3 $69 $418.80 $527.59 $67.41 $1,013.80 
4 $92 $593.34 $738.99 $94.43 $1,426.76 
5 $115 $627.92 $808.06 $103.25 $1,539.23 
6 $138 $620.61 $834.52 $106.63 $1,561.76 
7 $161 $602.38 $849.88 $108.60 $1,560.86 
8 $184 $578.95 $859.95 $109.88 $1,548.77 
9 $207 $545.32 $859.64 $109.84 $1,514.80 
10 $230 $523.23 $871.08 $111.30 $1,505.62 
 
Table 27: Effectiveness of educational campaign investments 
# of 
Education 
Investment 
Amount 
Label 
Profit 
Retailer 
profit 
Artist 
Profit 
Total Chain 
Profit 
0 $0 $47.59 $48.39 $6.18 $102.16 
1 $23 $489.45 $531.65 $67.93 $1,089.03 
2 $46 $616.34 $694.58 $88.75 $1,399.67 
3 $69 $625.72 $738.02 $94.30 $1,458.04 
4 $92 $625.27 $771.46 $98.58 $1,495.30 
5 $115 $612.09 $791.96 $101.19 $1,505.25 
6 $138 $593.69 $807.14 $103.13 $1,503.97 
7 $161 $572.99 $819.99 $104.78 $1,497.76 
8 $184 $539.22 $819.54 $104.72 $1,463.47 
9 $207 $511.27 $825.02 $105.42 $1,441.70 
10 $230 $482.25 $829.41 $105.98 $1,417.65 
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4.4.1 Impact of Legal and Educational Campaigns on Record Label’s Profit 
 The system can be used to identify a good, possibly optimal, piracy control 
investment amount for the record label. For example, Tables 26 and 27 show the best 
law-suit and educational campaigns investment for r = 0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 
0.2. It is best for the record label if they invest in five law-suits which provide a profit 
of $627.92 in this case. If the record label decides to implement educational strategy 
instead, three educational campaigns would provide the highest profit which is $625.72. 
One interesting result is that, from the supply chain perspective, it is optimal to invest 
in six law-suits or five educational campaigns instead. This indicates if the record label 
and the retailer coordinate (e.g. partial supports from retailers on label’s investment), 
better supply chain solution can be achieved and there will be a division of profit 
surplus under which both party can be better-off. 
 
Figure 15: The impact of legal and educational campaigns on record label’s profit ( r = 
0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2) 
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 Figure 15 shows that as the number of legal and educational campaigns goes 
beyond five and three, respectively, additional investments in piracy control wouldn’t 
help the record label since the number of consumers in the pirating segment is close to 
0 for high number of legal/educational campaigns, thus most consumers will buy a 
legitimate product rather than pirate (Figure 16a and 16b). Another interesting result is 
that when the amount of investment in legal and educational campaigns is low, 
educational campaigns are more effective than law-suits. This is because even if 
consumers are aware of law-suits, the impact of the legal strategy on consumer’s piracy 
risk costs is temporary so it wouldn’t affect consumer choice in the next period. This 
result suggests that, given limited resources to enforce copyright law, educational 
campaigns can provide more cost-effective remedies to combat piracy.  
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Figure 16: The relationship between the number of law-suits and educational 
campaigns and consumer piracy behaviors ( r = 0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2) 
We also examine the impact of legal and educational campaign effectiveness 
(  and  ) on the record label’s profit. As shown in Figure 17, when the effectiveness 
of legal/educational campaigns is low (0.2), educational campaigns provides more 
profit for the record label than law-suits. However, when both legal and educational 
campaigns become more effective, law-suits generate more profit. Based on the 
findings above, we can conclude that when the amount of investment and the 
effectiveness of both piracy control strategies are low, educational campaign strategy is 
better than law-suits. But, as the amount of piracy control investment and the 
effectiveness of strategies increases, law-suits become more effective. 
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Figure 17: The relationship between effectiveness of legal and educational campaign 
and record label’s profit 
4.4.2 Impact of Value-Added Services and Low-Price on Record Label’s Profit 
 Figure 18 shows the record label’s profit for value-added services (assuming 
0c ) and low-price strategy. The record label’s profit increases marginally when 
value-added effect is low, but start increasing rapidly as the value-added effect 
becomes high. This result suggests that, depending on the utility and consumer risk 
costs, the provision of added value or extended services which encourage consumers to 
purchase legitimate products should be substantial, and small increases in value-added 
service strategy wouldn’t enhance purchase intentions of consumers much. For low-
price strategy, we found that when the wholesale price is above 0.5, the record label’s 
profit starts decreasing. As the wholesale price increases, the retailer increases the price, 
and consumers have greater motivation to pirate rather than buy legitimate online 
music. 
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Figure 18: The relationship between value-added services and low-price strategy and 
record label’s profit ( r = 0.1, M = 0.15) 
One interesting result shown in Figure 19 is that as the record label increases 
the number of law-suits and educational campaigns, consumers who decided to do 
nothing (wait) increases. On the other hand, when the record label implements value-
added service and low-price strategy, the number of consumers who do nothing 
actually decreases. This finding indicates that value-added services and low-prices 
strategy have qualitatively different effects on consumer piracy behavior and consumer 
surplus compared to legal and educational campaigns.  
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Figure 19: The effects of different piracy control strategies on consumer behavior ( r = 
0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2) 
4.4.3 Combined Effect of Piracy Control Strategies on Record Label’s Profit 
4.4.3.1 Combined Law-Suits and Educational Campaigns with Value-added Service 
 As shown in Figure 20, when law-suits or educational campaigns and value-
added services are implement simultaneously, it provide more profits for the record 
label while requiring less investment in piracy control (the numbers of optimal law-
suits and educational campaigns decreases). Also, we found that the same results hold 
in the combined cases i.e. when the amount of investment funds is limited and the 
campaign effectiveness is low, educational campaigns and value-added services 
combination is more effective than law-suits and value-added services combination. 
However, as the amount of piracy control investment and the effectiveness of strategies 
increases, the combined legal and value-added service become more effective strategy 
(Figure 21). 
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Figure 20: The effects of combined piracy control strategies on record label’s profit ( r
= 0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2) 
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Figure 21: The relationship between effectiveness of legal and educational campaign 
with value-added services and record label’s profit 
4.4.3.2 Combined Law-suits and Educational Campaigns with Low-price 
For law-suits and low-price combination or educational campaigns and low-
price combination, the record label obtains the highest profit when the wholesale price 
0.5 (similar to the finding in the low-price strategy). However, the optimal record label 
profit is achieved when there are no law-suits or educational campaigns. As shown in 
Figure 22, when the wholesale price is high (0.8), additional investment in piracy 
control increases the profit because more consumers will pirate without it. However, 
when the wholesale price is low (0.5 or less), any investments in piracy control 
wouldn’t help the record label. This suggests that it may be better for the record label 
not to make any investments in piracy control and follow a low-price strategy in some 
cases. 
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Figure 22: The effects of combined piracy control strategies on record label’s profit ( r
= 0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2) 
4.4.3.3 Comparison of Combined Piracy Control Strategies on Record Label’s Profit 
 Finally, we compare the effectiveness of combined piracy control strategies to 
see which strategies provide more profit. Table 28 shows the optimal law-suit and 
educational campaigns investment, record label, retailer, artist, and total supply chain 
profits for r = 0.1, M = 0.15,   = 0.2,  = 0.2.  
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Table 28: Optimal solution for combined piracy control strategies 
 
# of 
Lawsuits 
Record Label 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
Artist 
Profit 
Total 
Profit 
 Value-added  
1.15 
4 $951.10 $1,078.88 $137.86 $2,167.84 
Low-price 
0.5 
0 $944.62 $800.52 $122.75 $1,867.89 
 
# of 
Educational 
Campaign 
Record Label 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
Artist 
Profit 
Total 
Profit 
Value-added  
1.15 
2 $971.82 $1,054.10 $134.69 $2,160.61 
Low-price 
0.5 
0 $942.70 $798.90 $122.50 $1,864.10 
 
For all the parameter settings, we compared the profit difference of the record 
label, retailer, artist, and total chain between value-added services combinations and 
low-price strategy combinations. Table 29 presents percentage of the cases where the 
difference in profit is positive (value-added services combination is better than low-
price combination). As can be seen, the record label prefers legal and educational 
campaigns with low-price strategy since it provides more profits for 74% and 67% of 
the cases respectively. Interestingly, however, from the retailer’s, artist’s, and total 
supply chain’s perspective, legal and educational campaign with value-added strategy 
is better than low-price strategy combination. This is because low-price combination 
strategy does not require any investment in piracy control; thus it would provide more 
profits for the record label. However, it is better for the retailer, artist, and total supply 
chain to combine legal and educational strategy with value-added services. In other 
words, if the players in the supply chain can coordinate, a larger supply chain profit can 
be achieved with combined value-added service strategy.  
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Table 29: Comparison of profit difference between combined value-added services and 
combined low-price strategy  
 
Record  
Label 
Retailer Artist 
Total  
Supply Chain 
Legal & Value-added 26% 100% 70% 100% 
Legal & Low-price
7
 74% 0% 30% 0% 
Average Profit Difference 
(legal & value-added 
combination – legal & low-
price combination) 
-$51.48 $197.23 $8.76 $228.30 
Educational & Value-added 33% 100% 63% 100% 
Educational & Low-price 67% 0% 37% 0% 
Average Profit Difference 
(legal & value-added 
combination – legal & low-
price combination) 
-$54.80 $148.60 $0.33 $172.10 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 To protect intellectual property and increase legitimate sales, record labels have 
employed numerous deterrent and preventive piracy control strategies. However, the 
effect of these strategies on consumer piracy behavior has yet been fully explored. The 
objectives of this research were to find good piracy control strategies in a market where 
some piracy is unavoidable, and investigate the impact of different piracy control 
strategies on consumers, retailers, record labels, and artists. An agent-based modeling 
approach was applied in pursuit of these objectives by modeling the environment 
where consumer piracy behaviors are affected by different piracy control strategies. 
  
                                                          
 
7
 Although we use the combination term, please note that the highest record label profit is obtained 
without any lawsuits or educational campaigns when the low-price strategy is implemented.  
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 Our numerical experiments suggest that educational strategy is particularly 
effective when the effectiveness of piracy control strategies and investment budget are 
low. Given the fact that the record labels may not have enough resources to enforce 
copyright law against millions of consumers who pirate, it may be more effective to 
design and deliver public campaigns that attempt to educate consumers about the risks 
and the negative social impact of piracy than enforcing copyright law via legal 
sanctions. This may be the reason why the RIAA recently decided to stop filing a legal 
law-suit against file-sharers and have taken a different approach that relies on the 
cooperation with ISPs (McBride and Smith 2008). 
Preventive and deterrent piracy control strategies have qualitatively different 
effects on consumer piracy behaviors. Our results indicate that the value-added service 
and low-price strategies provide consumers greater incentives to purchase legitimate 
products. When the legal and educational strategies are implemented, many consumers 
decide to neither pirate nor purchase songs. These strategies are more effective to deter 
piracy (move consumers from illegal file sharing to doing nothing), rather than 
providing incentives for legal sales. Also, the effectiveness of piracy control strategies 
can be improved when multiple strategies are combined. Our analysis shows that when 
legal or educational campaigns are combined with value-added services strategy, it 
provides more profits for the record label while requiring less investment in piracy 
controls. However, when the low-price strategy is implemented, consumers’ intention 
to purchase legitimate songs is already high (or pirating segment is very small), and 
any investments in legal and educational campaigns wouldn’t help to increase the 
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record label’s profit. Therefore, careful planning is required when record labels 
develop piracy control strategies. 
Our study has several limitations as well as potential avenues for future 
research. We focus on the effect of different piracy control strategies on consumer 
piracy behavior, thus the record label and consumers are the only active agents in our 
model. Relationships with other important players such as retailers, artists and 
government with more complex behavior can be considered. This may include different 
pricing options (e.g. subscription and nonlinear pricing), contracts (e.g. lump-sum and 
quantity discount) between record label and retailers, artists royalty negotiation, direct 
distribution channel, and government subsidy or taxation.  
Some of the probabilistic variables in the simulation were modeled using 
uniform and normal distributions. While these are reasonable choices in the absence of 
other information, other distributions can be used to examine the robustness of the 
results. Also, we chose the parameter values used in the simulation cautiously, but it is 
worthwhile to note that those values are more for illustrative purposes to demonstrate 
the relationship in the system, and may not be empirically valid. For example, we 
assumed that a legal action and an educational campaign have the same cost. However, 
if the costs of two actions are different, it may affect some of our results. Lastly, we 
chose to run the simulation for 50 time periods with 5 repetitions but do not analyze the 
number of replications and time periods needed to have predetermined level of 
confidence in the results. A statistical analysis to identify the required number of 
replications and time periods for each replication will improve the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
5.1 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
 This dissertation analyzed the effect of digital piracy on online music channel, 
explored consumer piracy risk cost, and suggested optimal supply chain coordination 
strategies using multi-method approaches including survey, mathematical modeling, 
and simulation. 
In the first study (Chapter 2), we explored the impact of piracy on digital music 
supply chain profitability under different contract arrangements between record labels 
and online retailers. Consumers' piracy risk cost was divided into two cases: 1) linear 
piracy cost and 2) fixed piracy cost. We also analyzed two contract types: 1) fixed fee 
contract and 2) per song contract. For each case, we identified an optimal Stackelberg 
equilibrium and analyzed how different piracy risk costs and contract types affect 
supply chain pricing, record label and retailer's profits, and supply chain coordination. 
In Chapter 3, we developed a theoretical and operational basis for 
conceptualizing a measurement model of consumer piracy risk using an empirical 
survey. Adapted from Perceived Risk Theory, we identified components of consumer 
piracy risk and empirically tested their importance in the context of illegal music 
downloads. In addition to examining the components of consumer piracy risk, we also 
explored how consumers assess their piracy risk with respect to the amount of content 
they pirate.  
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Chapter 4 provided an alternative methodology to evaluate the relationship 
between players in the digital supply chain. In particular, we analyzed the effectiveness 
of piracy control strategies used to dissuade consumers from illegal music downloads. 
We used an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach to 1) provide an alternative 
methodology for analyzing the piracy control strategies, 2) find good piracy control 
strategies in a market where some piracy is unavoidable, and 3) investigate the impact 
of piracy on consumers, retailers, record labels, and artists.  
5.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION 
 There are several ways in which this thesis has contributed to the literature on 
digital piracy, consumer piracy behaviors, online channel distribution, and supply chain 
coordination. First, the thesis has demonstrated that although piracy will reduce total 
supply chain profit, the magnitude of profit loss depends on type of consumers' piracy 
risk cost and the type of contracts in the supply chain. In addition, changes in 
consumers' piracy risk cost change the distribution of the profit between the record 
label and the retailer. As the investment in piracy controls increases, the retailer keeps a 
larger share of the profit surplus leaving the record label with a smaller share. Also, 
piracy has larger negative impact on the profitability of music albums containing a 
large number of popular songs. We demonstrated that a fixed fee full transfer contract 
will always coordinate the supply chain, and the profitability of the fixed fee contract 
further increases as 1) online market size increases, 2) consumer piracy risk cost 
increases, and 3) marginal unit cost decreases. 
Second, we extend and support the notion of consumer piracy risk as a multi-
dimensional construct formed by performance, time, privacy, moral awareness, and 
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monetary loss risk in the second study. The multi-dimensional conceptualization we 
propose and test offers detailed information about the structure of consumer piracy risk 
and the relative importance of each risk component. We found that moral awareness 
risk is the most important risk component explaining the overall consumer piracy risk. 
Record labels can design and deliver public campaigns which attempt to educate and 
inform consumers about the risks and the negative social impact of piracy. Through 
this educational strategy to control piracy, the music industry can encourage consumers 
to think critically (or increase psychological or social discomfort) about how they 
acquire music, and motivate consumers’ attitude changes. 
Third, many piracy acts may involve pirating more than one song in a session, 
but it is unclear whether consumer piracy risk is increasing in the amount of content 
pirated or it is fixed. Our findings suggest that although the relative importance of 
monetary-loss and privacy risks increases with the amount of content pirated, 
consumers’ overall piracy risk does not change with the amount of content pirated in a 
session suggesting that consumers’ risk cost is in fact fixed. The implications of fixed 
piracy risk cost where more than one song is pirated in a single session have profound 
impact on pricing and profitability of the music industry. When the piracy risk cost is 
fixed, popular songs and/or artists suffer more from piracy. For popular artists, a more 
drastic solution to the problem of piracy should be considered such as a subscription 
model that is less vulnerable to piracy while encouraging legitimate sales. 
Fourth, the thesis has provided an alternative methodology to analyze the 
effectiveness of piracy control strategies used to dissuade consumers from illegal music 
downloads. We used an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach to analyze the 
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effectiveness of various piracy control strategies, find good piracy control strategies in 
a market where some piracy is unavoidable, and investigate the impact of piracy on 
consumers, retailers, record labels, and artists. We found that when the effectiveness of 
piracy control strategies and investment budget are low, it is best to use educational 
campaign strategy. Also, we demonstrated that the value-added service or low-price 
strategy provides consumers greater incentives to purchase legitimate products 
(moving from illegal downloading to the legal segment). However, when the legal or 
educational strategy is implemented, many consumers in the pirating segment decide 
not to pirate instead of purchase songs. Therefore, legal and educational strategies are 
more effective to deter piracy (moving from illegal to doing nothing segment), rather 
than providing incentives for legal sales. When legal or educational campaigns are 
combined with value-added services strategy, the combination provides more profits 
for the record label while requiring less investment in piracy controls. However, when 
the low-price strategy is implemented, consumers’ intention to purchase legitimate 
songs is already high, and any investments in legal and educational campaigns 
wouldn’t help to increase the record label’s profit.  
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There are some limitations of the thesis which have been discussed separately 
at the end of each study (in Chapters 2, 3 and 4). This section presents some ideas for 
future research. First, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the record 
label and online retailer, and does not consider other important players in the chain 
such as artists and government. Therefore, it would be promising to investigate how 
artist royalty (e.g. negotiation) and government subsidy or taxation affect digital music 
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supply chain coordination. Also, it would be interesting to examine the impact of 
different pricing schemes such as subscription pricing, quantity discounts, non-linear 
pricing, or a mixed per unit and subscription pricing on profits of record labels and 
online retailers and consumer surplus. Lastly, while we propose that the fixed fee full 
transfer will fully coordinate the supply chain, our model does not consider the actual 
value of the lump sum payment by the record label. Thus, it would be promising to 
investigate the optimal fixed fee payment based on different factors such as the relative 
bargaining power of the record label and retailer.  
 
123 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Bagozzi, Richard P. and Youjae Yi, "On the Evaluation of Structural Equation 
Models," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16, 1, (1988), 74-94. 
 
Bankes, Steven C., "Agent-based modeling: A revolution?," Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 2002, 7199-7200. 
 
Barki, Henri, Suzanne Rivardand Jean Talbot, "Toward an Assessment of Software 
Development Risk," Journal of Management Information Systems, 10, 2, (1993), 203-
225. 
 
Bauer, Raymond, "Consumer Behavior as Risk Taking," American Marketing 
Association, (1960), 389-398. 
 
Bauer, Raymond, Consumer Behavior as Risk Taking, Harvard University Press, 
Boston, MA, 1967. 
 
Benevenuto, Fabricio, Cristiano Costa, Marisa Vasconcelos, Virgilio Almeida, Jussara 
Almeidaand Miranda Mowbray, "Impact of Peer Incentives on the Dissemination of 
Polluted Content," Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing, 
Dijon, France, 2006, 1875-1879. 
 
Bhattacharjee, Sudip, Ram D Gopaland G Lawrence Sanders, "Digital music and 
online sharing: Software piracy 2.0?," Communications of the ACM, 46, 7, (2003), 107-
111. 
 
Bhattacharjee, Sudip, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwacharaand James R. Marsden, 
"Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music 
Industry Legal Actions," Journal of Law and Economics, 49, 1, (2006a), 91-114. 
 
Bhattacharjee, Sudip, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwacharaandand James R. 
Marsden, "Consumer Search and Retailer Strategies in the Presence of Online Music 
Sharing," Journal of Management Information Systems, 23, 1, (2006b), 129-159. 
 
Bockstedt, Jesse C., Robert J. Kauffmanand Frederick J. Riggins, "The Move to Artist-
Led On-Line Music Distribution: A Theory-Based Assessment and Prospects for 
Structural Changes in the Digital Music Market," International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce, 10, 3, (2006), 7-38. 
 
Cachon, Gerard P. and Martin A. Lariviere, "Supply Chain Coordination with 
Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations," Management Science, 51, 1, 
(2005), 30-44. 
 
124 
 
Chellappa, Ramnath K. and Shivendu Shivendu, "Economic Implications of Variable 
Technology Standards for Movie Piracy in a Global Context," Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 20, 2, (2003a), 137-168. 
 
Chellappa, Ramnath K. and Shivendu Shivendu, "Pay now or pay later?: managing 
digital product supply chains," Proceedings of the 5th international conference on 
Electronic commerce, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2003b, 230 - 234. 
 
Chellappa, Ramnath K. and Shivendu Shivendu, "Managing Piracy: Pricing and 
Sampling Strategies for Digital Experience Goods in Vertically Segmented Markets," 
Information Systems Research, 16, 4, (2005), 400-417. 
 
Chellappa, Ramnath K. and Shivendu Shivendu, "Upstream Contracts in Supply Chain 
for Digital Goods," Proceedings of the Conference on Information Systems and 
Technology, Seattle, WA, 2007, 3-4. 
 
Chen, Y. and I. Png, "Software pricing and copyright enforcement: Private profit vis-a-
vis social welfare.," Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Information 
Systems, Charlotte, NC, 1999, 119-123. 
 
Chen, Yeh-ning and Ivan Png, "Information Goods Pricing and Copyright 
Enforcement: Welfare Analysis," Information Systems Research, 14, 1, (2003), 107-
123. 
 
Cheng, Hsing K, Ronald R Simsand Hildy Teegen, "To purchase or to pirate software: 
An empirical study," Journal of Management Information Systems, 13, 4, (1997), 49-
60. 
 
Chiang, Wei-yu Kevin, Dilip Chhajedand James D. Hess, "Direct Marketing, Indirect 
Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design," Management 
Science, 49, 1, (2003), 1-20. 
 
Chin, Wynne W., "Issues and Opinion on Structural Equation Modeling," MIS 
Quarterly, 22, 1, (1998), 7-16. 
 
Chin, Wynne W. and Abhijit Gopal, "Adoption Intention in GSS: Relative Importance 
of Beliefs," ACM SIGMIS Database, 26, 2-3, (1995), 42-64. 
 
Chin, Wynne W., Abhijit Gopaland W. David Salisbury, "Advancing the Theory of 
Adaptive Structuration: The Development of a Scale to Measure Faithfulness of 
Appropriation," Information Systems Research, 8, 4, (1997), 342-367. 
 
Chiou, Jyh-Shen, Chien-yi Huangand Hsin-hui Lee, "The antecedents of music piracy 
attitudes and intentions," Journal of Business Ethics, 57, 2, (2005), 161-174. 
 
125 
 
Chiu, Hung-Chang, Yi-Ching Hsiehand Mei-Chien Wang, "How to Encourage 
Customers to Use Legal Software," Journal of Business Ethics, 80, 3, (2008a), 583–
595. 
 
Chiu, Hung-Chang, Yuh-May Lin, Monle Lee, Min-En Niehand Hsiang-Chun Chen, 
"How to discourage online music piracy," International Journal of Management and 
Enterprise Development, 5, 6, (2008b), 723-738. 
 
Chwelos, Paul, Izak Benbasatand Albert S. Dexter, "Empirical Test of an EDI 
Adoption Model," Information Systems Research, 12, 3, (2001), 304-321. 
 
Clemons, Eric K., Bin Guand Karl Reiner Lang, "Newly Vulnerable Markets in an Age 
of Pure Information Products: An Analysis of Online Music and Online News," 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 19, 3, (2002), 17-41. 
 
Conner, Kathleen Reavis and Richard P. Rumelt, "Software Piracy: An Analysis of 
Protection Strategies," Management Science, 37, 2, (1991), 125-139. 
 
Cronan, Timothy Paul and Sulaiman Al-Rafee, "Factors that Influence the Intention to 
Pirate Software and Media," Journal of Business Ethics, 78, 4, (2008), 527-545. 
 
d’Astous, Alain, Francois Colbertand Daniel Montpetit, "Music Piracy on the Web – 
How Effective Are Anti-Piracy Arguments? Evidence From the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour," Journal of Consumer Policy, 28, 3, (2005), 289-310. 
 
Edwards, Jeffrey R.  and Richard P. Bagozzi, "On the Nature and Direction of 
Relationships Between Constructs and Measures," Psychological Methods, 5, 2, 
(2000), 155-174. 
 
EFF, "RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later," Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2008. 
 
Featherman, Mauricio S.  and Paul A. Pavlou, "Predicting e-services adoption: a 
perceived risk facets perspective," International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 
59, 4, (2003), 451-474. 
 
Fornell, Claes and David F. Larcker, "Evaluating Structural Equation Models with 
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error," Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 
1, (1981), 39-50. 
 
Forsythe, Sandra M.  and Bo Shi, "Consumer patronage and risk perceptions in Internet 
shopping," Journal of Business Research, 56, 11, (2003), 867-875. 
 
Garbarino, Ellen  and Michal Strahilevitz, "Gender differences in the perceived risk of 
buying online and the effects of receiving a site recommendation," Journal of Business 
Research, 57, 7, (2004), 768-775. 
 
126 
 
Gefen, David and Detmar Straub, "A practical guide to factorial validity using PLS-
Graph: tutorial and annotated example," Communications of the Association for 
Information Systems, 16, (2005), 91-109. 
 
Givon, Moshe, Vijay Mahajanand Eitan Muller, "Software Piracy: Estimation of Lost 
Sales and the Impact on Software Diffusion," Journal of Marketing, 59, 1, (1995), 29-
37. 
 
Good, Nathaniel S.  and Aaron Krekelberg, "Usability and privacy: a study of KaZaA 
P2P file-sharing," Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in 
computing systems, 2003, 137-144. 
 
Gopal, Ram D and G Lawrence Sanders, "Preventive and deterrent controls for 
software piracy," Journal of Management Information Systems, 13, Spring, (1997), 29-
47. 
 
Gopal, Ram D and G Lawrence Sanders, "International software piracy: Analysis of 
key issues and impacts," Information Systems Research, 9, 4, (1998), 380-397. 
 
Gopal, Ram D, G Lawrence Sanders, Sudip Bhattacharjee, Manish Agrawaland 
Suzanne C Wagner, "A Behavioral Model of Digital Music Piracy," Journal of 
Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 14, 2, (2004), 89. 
 
Gravetter, Frederick J and Larry B. Wallnau, Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 
Thomson Learning, Belmont, CA, 2004. 
 
Hair, Joseph F., Rolph E. Anderson, Ronald L. Tathamand William C. Black, 
Multivariate Data Analysis: With Readings, Prentice Hall, 2005. 
 
Hong, Seung-Hyun, "The recent growth of the internet and changes in household-level 
demand for entertainment " Information Economics and Policy, 19, 3-4, (2007), 304-
318. 
 
Hsieh, J. J. Po-An, Arun Raiand Mark Keil, "Understanding Digital Inequality: 
Comparing Continued Use Behavioral Models of the Socio-Economically Advantaged 
and Disadvantaged," Management Information Systems Quarterly, 32, 1, (2008), 97-
126. 
 
Hui, Kai-Lung and Ivan Png, "Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded 
Music," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 2, 1, (2003), article 11. 
 
IFPI, "The Recording Industry 2006 Piracy Report: Protecting Creativity in Music," 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 2006. 
 
IFPI, "Digital music report," International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 
2008. 
127 
 
 
IFPI, "Digital Music Report: Key Statistics," International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry 2009. 
 
Jacoby, Jacob and Leon B. Kaplan, "The Components of Perceived Risk," Proceedings 
of the Third Annual Conference of the Association for Consumer Research, 1972, 382-
393. 
 
Jasper, Cynthia R.  and Sara J. Ouellette, "Consumers' perception of risk and the 
purchase of apparel from catalogs," Journal of Direct Marketing, 8, 2, (1994), 23-36. 
 
Jeong, Bong-Keun, Moutaz Khoujaand Kexin Zhao, "Conceptualization and 
Measurement of Consumer Piracy Risk in the Context of Illegal Music Downloads," 
(2010a),  
Jeong, Bong-Keun, Moutaz Khoujaand Kexin Zhao, "Supply Chain Coordination in the 
Digital Age," (2010b),  
Keil, Mark, Bernard C. Y. Tan, Kwok-Kee Wei, Timo Saarinen, Virpi Tuunainenand 
Arjen Wassenaar, "A Cross-Cultural Study on Escalation of Commitment Behavior in 
Software Projects," Management Information Systems Quarterly, 24, 2, (2000), 299-
325. 
 
Khouja, Moutaz, Mirsad Hadzikadic, Hari K. Rajagopalanand Li-Shiang Tsay, 
"Application of complex adaptive systems to pricing of reproducible information 
goods," Decision Support Systems, 44, 3, (2008), 725-739. 
 
Khouja, Moutaz and SungJune Park, "Optimal Pricing of Digital Experience Goods 
Under Piracy," Journal of Management Information Systems, 24, 3, (2007), 109-141. 
 
Khouja, Moutaz and Yulan Wang, "The impact of digital channel distribution on the 
experience goods industry," forthcoming in  European Journal of Operational 
Research, (2010),  
Kim, Dan J., Donald L. Ferrinand H. Raghav Rao, "A trust-based consumer decision-
making model in electronic commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their 
antecedents," Decision Support Systems, 44, 2, (2008), 544-564. 
 
Kim, Sung S. and Jai-Yeol Son, "Out of dedication or constraint? A dual model of 
post-adoption phenomena and its empirical test in the context of online services," MIS 
Quarterly, 33, 1, (2009), 49-70. 
 
Kwong, Kenneth K, Oliver H M Yau, Jenny S Y Lee, Leo Y M Sinand Alan C B Tse, 
"The Effects of Attitudinal and Demographic Factors on Intention to Buy Pirated CDs: 
The Case of Chinese Consumers," Journal of Business Ethics, 47, 3, (2003), 223. 
 
Law, Averill M. and W. David Kelton, Simulation Modeling and Analysis, McGraw 
Hill, 2000. 
 
128 
 
Levin, AM, Dato-on M Conwayand K Rhee, "Money for nothing and hits for free: the 
ethics of downloading music from peer-to-peer web sites," Journal of Marketing 
Theory and Practice, 12, 1, (2004), 48-60. 
 
Liang, Jian, Rakesh Kumar, Yongjian Xiand Keith W. Ross, "Pollution in P2P File 
Sharing Systems," Proceedings of the IEEE INFOCOM, Miami, FL, 2005, 1174-1185. 
 
Lim, Nena, "Consumers' perceived risk: sources versus consequences," Electronic 
Commerce Research and Application, 2, 3, (2003), 216-228. 
 
Limayem, Moez, Mohamed Khalifaand Wynne W. Chin, "Factors motivating software 
piracy: A longitudinal study," IEEE Transaction Engineering Management, 51, 4, 
(2004), 414-425. 
 
Littler, Dale and Demetris Melanthiou, "Consumer perceptions of risk and uncertainty 
and the implications for behaviour towards innovative retail services: The case of 
Internet Banking," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 13, 6, (2006), 431-
443. 
 
Liu, Yongmei and Yanlong Zhang, "Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts for 
Online Game Industry," Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on 
Management of Innovation and Technology, 2006, 867-871. 
 
McBride, Sarah and Ethan Smith, "Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits," Wall 
Street Journal, December 19, 2008. 
 
McCorkle, Denny E., "The role of perceived risk in mail order catalog shopping," 
Journal of Direct Marketing, 4, 4, (1990), 26-35. 
 
Miazaki, Anthony D.  and Ana Fernandez, "Consumer Perceptions of Privacy and 
Security Risks for Online Shopping," Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35, 1, (2005), 27-
44. 
 
Mitchell, Vincent-Wayne, "Consumer perceived risk: conceptualisations and models," 
European Journal of Marketing, 33, 1/2, (1999), 163-195. 
 
Moores, Trevor T.  and Jerry Cha-Jan Chang, "Ethicial Decision Making in Software 
Piracy: Initial Development and Test of a Four-Component Model," MIS Quarterly, 30, 
1, (2006), 167-180. 
 
Muthoo, Abhinay, Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
 
Nandedkar, Ankur and Vishal Midha, "Optimism in Music Piracy: A Pilot Study," 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Phoenix, 
Arizona, 2009,  
129 
 
Nascimento, Fernando and Wilfried R. Vanhonacker, "Optimal Strategic Pricing Of 
Reproducible Consumer Products," Management Science, 34, 8, (1988), 921-937. 
 
Null, Christopher, "Fake, infected media file attacks half a million victims in a week," 
Yahoo! Tech, 2008. 
 
O'Rourke, Morgan, "Setbacks in the music piracy war," Risk Management, 2004. 
 
Peace, A Graham, Dennis F Gallettaand James Y L Thong, "Software piracy in the 
workplace: A model and empirical test," Journal of Management Information Systems, 
20, 1, (2003), 153-177. 
 
Peter, J. Paul and Michael J. Ryan, "An Investigation of Perceived Risk at the Brand 
Level," Journal of Marketing Research, 13, 2, (1976), 184-188. 
 
Premkumar, G. Prem, "Alternate Distribution Strategies for Digital Music," 
Communications of the ACM, 46, 9, (2003), 89-95. 
 
Premkumar, G., K. Ramamurthyand Sree Nilakanta, "Implementation of electronic 
data interchange: an innovation diffusion perspective," Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 11, 2, (1994), 157-186. 
 
Qureshi, Israr and Deborah Compeau, "Assessing Between-Group Differences in 
Information Systems Research: A Comparison of Covariance- And Component-Based 
SEM," MIS Quarterly, 33, 1, (2009), 197-214. 
 
RIAA, "Key Statistics," Recording Industry Association of America, 2008. 
 
Ringle, Christian Marc, Sven Wendeand Alexander Will, "SmartPLS," Hamburg, 
Germany, (2005),  
Roselius, Ted, "Rankings of Risk Reduction Methods," The Journal of Marketing, 35, 
1, (1971), 56-61. 
 
Shapiro, Carl and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, Massachusetts, 1999. 
 
Shin, Seungwon, Jaeyeon Jungand Hari Balakrishnan, "Malware prevalence in the 
KaZaA file-sharing network," Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on 
Internet measurement Rio de Janeriro, Brazil, 2006, 333-338. 
 
Shultz, Clifford J. and Bill Saporito, "Protecting intellectual property: Strategies and 
recommendations to deter counterfeiting and brand piracy in global markets," The 
Columbia Journal of World Business, 31, 1, (1996), 18-27. 
 
Siegfried, Robert M, "Student Attitudes on Software Piracy and Related Issues of 
Computer Ethics," Ethics and Information Technology, 6, 4, (2004), 215-222. 
130 
 
 
Sims, Ronald R., Hsing K. Chengand Hildy Teegen, "Toward a Profile of Student 
Software Piraters," Journal of Business Ethics, 15, 8, (1996), 839-849. 
 
Sinha, Rajiv K. and Naomi Mandel, "Preventing Digital Music Piracy: The Carrot or 
the Stick?," Journal of Marketing, 72, 1, (2008), 1-15. 
 
Spence, Homer E., James F. Engeland Roger D. Blackwell, "Perceived Risk in Mail-
Order and Retail Store Buying," Journal of Marketing Research, 7, 3, (1970), 364-369. 
 
Srbljinovic, Armano and Ognjen Skunca, "An Introduction to Agent Based Modelling 
and Simulation of Social Processes," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex 
Systems, 1, 1-2, (2003), 1-8. 
 
Stafford, Thomas F.  and Andrew Urbaczewski, "Spyware: The Ghost in the Machine," 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 14, (2004), 291-306. 
 
Stone, Brad, "Want to Copy iTunes Music? Go Ahead, Apple Says," New York Times, 
January 7, 2009. 
 
Stone, Robert N.  and Kjell Gronhaug, "Perceived Risk: Further Considerations for the 
Marketing Discipline," European Journal of Marketing, 27, 3, (1993), 39-50. 
 
Sundararjan, A., "Managing Digital Piracy:  Pricing and Protection," Information 
Systems Research, 15, 3, (2004), 287-308. 
 
Tabachnick, Barbara G. and Linda S. Fidell, Using Multivariate Statistics, Allyn & 
Bacon, Boston, 2007. 
 
Takeyama, L., "The welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectural 
property in the presence of network externalities.," Journal of Industrial Economics, 
62, 2, (1994), 155-166. 
 
Tan, Benjamin, "Understanding consumer ethical decision making with respect to 
purchase of pirated software," Journal of Consumer Marketing, 19, 2, (2002), 96-111. 
 
Tan, Jennifer, "Firm Says 2003 Viruses Caused $55B Damage," Washington Post, 
January 16, 2004. 
 
Thong, James Y. L. and Chee-sing Yap, "Testing an Ethical Decision-Making Theory: 
The Case of Softlifting," Journal of Management Information Systems, 15, 1, (1998), 
213-237. 
 
Tsay, Andy A. and Narendra Agrawal, "Channel Conflict and Coordination in the E-
Commerce Age," Production and Operations Management, 13, 1, (2004), 93-110. 
 
131 
 
Twomey, Paul and Richard Cadman, "Agent-based modelling of customer behaviour in 
the telecoms and media markets," Info - The journal of policy, regulation and strategy 
for telecommunications, 4, 1, (2002), 56-63. 
 
Veloutsou, Cleopatra  and Xuemei Bian, "A cross-national examination of consumer 
perceived risk in the context of non-deceptive counterfeit brands," Journal of 
Consumer Behaviour, 7, 1, (2008), 3-20. 
 
Wade, Jared, "The Music Industry's War on Piracy," Risk Management, 2004. 
 
Wetzels, Martin, Gaby Odekerken-Schröderand Claudia van Oppen, "Using PLS path 
modelling for assessing hierarchical construct models: guidelines and empirical 
illustration," MIS Quarterly, 33, 1, (2009), 177-195. 
 
Wolfe, Scott E., George E. Higginsand Catherine D. Marcum, "Deterrence and Digital 
Piracy: A Preliminary Examination of the Role of Viruses," Social Science Computer 
Reviews, 26, 3, (2008), 317-333. 
 
Xu, Heng, Hao Wangand Hock-Hai Teo, "Predicting the Usage of P2P Sharing 
Software: The Role of Trust and Perceived Risk," Proceedings of the 38th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2005, 201a. 
 
 
  
132 
 
APPENDIX A: PROOFS 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consumer i 's net gain from purchasing   songs is  
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Proof of Proposition 2: Centralized chain 
1. No Piracy 
Substituting the first part of *  into NCC  and taking the first derivative gives:  
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The necessary condition for optimality 0=
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d NCC  gives tcp 2=1 . The second derivative 
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d NCC , thus NCC  is convex decreasing. 
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From 1) and 2), tcp 2=1  is the unconstrained optimal if 01
 p . If 0
1
>  p , then the 
largest value of p  which result in a consumer purchase quantity of 0  is optimal. This 
value is obtained by setting   in the equation (2) to 0  which yield 
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2. Linear piracy cost 
Substituting the first part of *  and LG  into LCC  and taking the first derivative gives:  
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the largest value of p  which result in a consumer purchase quantity of 0  is optimal. 
This value is obtained by setting   in the equation (2) to 0  which yield 
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3. Fixed piracy cost 
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Substituting the first part of *  and FG  into FCC  and taking the first derivative gives:  
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dp
d FCC  increases and approaches zero as p  goes to positive infinity. This implies 
that FCC  decreases on ),( 1p , increases on ),( 21 pp , and decreases on ),( 2 p . 
Therefore, 2p  is the global optimal. 
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According to Equation (5), there is an upper limit of p , p , in order to make the 
purchase probability non-negative, and 0=)( pFCC . Therefore, 2p  is the global optimal.  
Proof of Proposition 3: Per song contract 
1. No piracy 
Substituting the first part of *  into N REPS ,  and taking the first derivative gives:  
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, thus N REPS ,  is convex decreasing. 
From 1) and 2), )2(=1 rcwp   is the unconstrained optimal. If 01
>  p , then the largest 
value of p  which result in a consumer purchase quantity of 0  is optimal. This value 
is obtained by setting   in the equation (2) to 0  which yield 
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 Substituting the first part of *  and *p  into N RLPS ,  and taking the first 
derivative w.r.t w  gives (assuming that 0  ):  
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2. Linear piracy cost 
Substituting the first part of *  and LG  into L REPS ,  and taking the first derivative 
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Substituting the first part of * , LG , and *p  into L RLPS ,  and taking the first 
derivative gives assuming that 0  ):  
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3. Fixed piracy cost 
Substituting the first part of *  and FG  into F REPS ,  and taking the first derivative 
gives:  
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
8
)2(96)824(
2
1
82
=
222
1

p  and  
 

8
)2(96)824(
2
1
82
=
222
2

p , let 0112 )(2=   . 
1) When 0> , 12 > pp . 
)256( 22
2



M
 is negative, the second part of the derivative can be written as  
 30110112211
22 ))(16)(163232442(8   pcwcwp rr   
 41111
22 ))(6663(3  pcwwcw rr  .  
Since 0> , 
dp
d F REPS ,
 increases and approaches zero as p  goes to positive infinity. 
This implies that F REPS ,  decreases on ),( 1p , increases on ),( 21 pp , and decreases on 
),( 2 p . Therefore, 2p  is the global optimal. 
2) When 0< , 21 > pp . 
)256( 22
2



M
 is negative, the second part of the derivative can be written as  
 30110112211
22 ))(16)(163232442(8   pcwcwp rr   
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 41111
22 ))(6663(3  pcwwcw rr  .  
Since 0< , 
dp
d F REPS ,
 decreases and approaches zero as p  goes to positive infinity. 
This implies that F REPS ,  increases on ),( 2p , decreases on ),( 12 pp , and increases on 
),( 1 p . According to Equation (5), there is an upper limit of p , p , in order to make 
the purchase probability non-negative, and 0=)(, p
F
REPS . Therefore, 2p  is the global 
optimal. Also, please note that, in the fixed piracy risk cost case, the closed form 
solution for w  can't be obtained.  
Proof of Proposition 4: Fixed fee full transfer contract  
The optimal solutions under the fixed fee full transfer contract can be derived by 
following similar arguments in previous proofs.  
Proof of Proposition 5: Fixed fee partial transfer contract  
The optimal solutions under the fixed fee partial transfer contract can be derived by 
following similar arguments in previous proofs. 
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APPENDIX B: NETLOGO CODE FOR THE SIMULATION MODEL 
 
 
globals 
[ 
retail-price  
number-of-legal 
number-of-educational 
constant-legal 
constant-educational 
value-added-service 
] 
 
breed 
[ consumers consumer ] 
 
breed 
[ record-labels record-label ] 
 
consumers-own 
[ 
  scale-of-utility ; y 
  shape-of-utility ; k 
  number-of-songs  ; mu = number of songs the consumer is interested in purchasing in 
each time period 
  song-valuation   ; y * mu ^ k 
  piracy-risk  ; risk cost that consumer attaches to piracy (per act basis) 
  initial-piracy-risk ; intial risk cost that consumer attaches to piracy  
  previous-period-piracy-risk ; risk cost in the previous period 
  net-purchase-gain ; song-valuation - mu * price 
  net-piracy-gain ; song-valuation - piracy-risk 
  decision ; whether pirate or purchase 
  prob-legal-awareness ; probability of legal strategy awareness 
  prob-educational-awareness ; probability of educational strategy awareness 
  legal-awareness-impact ; 10% increase when aware  
  legal-not-awareness-impact ; 10% decrease when not aware  
  education-awareness-impact ; 5% increase when aware  
  ranval 
  social-pressure 
] 
 
record-labels-own 
[ 
  wholesale-price ; w 
  margin ; M 
  legal-investment-cost ;cost for each law-suit 
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  educational-investment-cost ; cost for each educational campaign 
  total-legal-investment 
  total-educational-investment 
  royalty-rate 
  record-label-profit 
  retailer-profit 
  artist-profit 
  retailer-variable-cost 
  value-added-service-cost 
] 
 
to setup 
  clear-all  ;clear the simulation screen 
  setup-record-labels 
  setup-consumers 
end 
 
to setup-record-labels 
  create-record-labels 1 
    ask record-labels 
  [ 
  set wholesale-price (wholesalesprice) 
  set margin (label-margin) ;reduce the margin for the low-price effect 
  set retail-price (1 + margin) * wholesale-price ;(1+M) * w 
  set number-of-legal (number-of-legal-action) 
  set number-of-educational (number-of-education) 
  set constant-legal (legal-awareness-effective) ;0.3 
  set constant-educational (education-awareness-effective) ;0.3 
  set legal-investment-cost 34 ;total market value for 1000 consumer is around 3400 
  set educational-investment-cost 34 
  set royalty-rate (artist-royalty-rate) 
  set retailer-variable-cost 0.2 
  set total-legal-investment legal-investment-cost * number-of-legal 
  set total-educational-investment educational-investment-cost * number-of-educational  
  set value-added-service-cost 0 
  ] 
end 
 
;set up consumer properties 
to setup-consumers 
  create-consumers number-of-consumers 
  set-default-shape consumers "dot" 
  layout-circle consumers 10 
  ask consumers 
  [ 
    set color white       
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    ;set initial piracy risk for consumers  
    set piracy-risk (random-normal risk-mean risk-sd)             
     
    while [piracy-risk <= 0] 
    [set piracy-risk (random-normal risk-mean risk-sd)] 
     
    set initial-piracy-risk piracy-risk 
    set previous-period-piracy-risk piracy-risk 
    set social-pressure 0.5 ;equal weight for social pressure 
    set value-added-service (value-added-effect) 
    set legal-awareness-impact (legal-aware-impact)  
    set legal-not-awareness-impact (legal-not-aware-impact)  
    set education-awareness-impact (education-aware-impact)  
    set decision -1  ;consumer has not made a decision yet (default value) 
                     ;1 means consumer bought 
                     ;2 means consumer pirated 
                     ;3 means consumer do nothing 
  ]   
end 
 
;run simulation 
to go 
  purchase-decision-consumer 
  evaluate-record-label-profit 
  change-consumer-risk-by-legal-action 
  change-consumer-risk-educational-action 
  adjust-social-pressure 
end 
 
; decide whether consumer purchases or pirates 
to purchase-decision-consumer 
  ;make purchase/pirate decision   
  ask consumers     
    [          
      ;set initial utility values for consumers for each period 
      set scale-of-utility (random-normal scale-mean scale-sd)  
      set shape-of-utility (random-float 1 / 3.333333) + 0.5 ; k range between 0.5 and 0.8 
      set number-of-songs ceiling (random-normal song-mean song-sd) 
 
      while [scale-of-utility <= 0] 
      [ set scale-of-utility (random-normal scale-mean scale-sd) ] 
 
      while [number-of-songs <= 0] 
      [ set number-of-songs ceiling (random-normal song-mean song-sd) ]      
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      ;caluate net purchase gain and net piracy gain 
      set song-valuation scale-of-utility * number-of-songs ^ shape-of-utility           
      ;set net-purchase-gain (value-added-service * song-valuation - number-of-songs * 
retail-price) 
      ;set net-piracy-gain (song-valuation - piracy-risk)                    
      ;prevent that the social-pressure becomes 0 
       ifelse social-pressure > 0.01 
        [ 
          set net-purchase-gain (1 - social-pressure) * (value-added-service * song-
valuation - number-of-songs * retail-price) 
          set net-piracy-gain (social-pressure) * (song-valuation - piracy-risk) 
        ] 
        [  
          set net-purchase-gain 0.99 * (song-valuation - number-of-songs * retail-price) 
          set net-piracy-gain 0.01 * (song-valuation - piracy-risk) 
        ]      
         
      ifelse (net-purchase-gain < 0 and net-piracy-gain < 0) 
      [         
        set decision 3 ;3 means consumer do nothing 
      ] 
      [ 
        ifelse (net-purchase-gain >= net-piracy-gain) 
        [ 
          ;purchase 
          set decision 1 ;1 means consumer purchased 
        ] 
        [  
          ;pirate 
          set decision 2 ;2 means consumer pirated 
        ]    
      ]       
    ]  
end 
 
;calculate record label, retailer, and artist profit 
to evaluate-record-label-profit 
  ask record-labels 
  [ 
    if value-added-service = 1.05 
    [ 
      set value-added-service-cost 5 
    ] 
    if value-added-service = 1.10 
    [ 
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      set value-added-service-cost 10 
    ] 
    if value-added-service = 1.15 
    [ 
      set value-added-service-cost 20 
    ] 
  ;set margin margin - 0.01 in the case of price-reduction 
  set record-label-profit (wholesale-price - (1 + margin) * wholesale-price * royalty-
rate)* (sum [number-of-songs] of consumers with [decision = 1]) - total-legal-
investment - total-educational-investment - value-added-service-cost 
  set retailer-profit (retail-price - retailer-variable-cost) * (sum [number-of-songs] of 
consumers with [decision = 1]) 
  set artist-profit retail-price * royalty-rate * (sum [number-of-songs] of consumers 
with [decision = 1])  
  ] 
end 
 
;change consumer risk cost by legal action 
to change-consumer-risk-by-legal-action 
ask consumers 
[ 
  set prob-legal-awareness 1 - (1 / e ^ (number-of-legal-action * constant-legal)) 
  set ranval random-float 1 
    ifelse prob-legal-awareness > ranval ;if aware of legal action 
    [ 
      set piracy-risk  (1 + legal-awareness-impact) * piracy-risk ; increase the risk cost by 
10% 
    ] 
    [ 
      ;if unaware of legal-strategy,  
      ifelse piracy-risk = initial-piracy-risk ; in the case of first period or the piracy risk 
cost has never been increased 
      [ 
        set piracy-risk piracy-risk 
      ] 
      [ 
        ;else means that the risk cost has been increased at least once, thus can reduce the 
risk cost by 5% while it is greater than intial-risk 
        ifelse piracy-risk > initial-piracy-risk 
        [ 
          set piracy-risk (1 - legal-not-awareness-impact) * piracy-risk 
        ] 
        [ 
          set piracy-risk initial-piracy-risk ;the risk cost can't go below initial risk cost 
        ] 
      ]   
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    ] 
]  
end 
 
;change consumer risk cost by educational campaigns 
to change-consumer-risk-educational-action 
ask consumers 
[ 
  set prob-educational-awareness 1 - (1 / e ^ (number-of-education * constant-
educational)) 
  set ranval random-float 1 
   
    if prob-educational-awareness > ranval ;if aware of legal action 
    [ 
      set piracy-risk (1 + education-awareness-impact) * piracy-risk ; increase the risk 
cost by 5%  
    ] 
]  
end 
 
to adjust-social-pressure 
ask consumers 
[ 
  set social-pressure (count consumers with [decision = 2]) / (count consumers) 
] 
end
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APPENDIX C: FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE NETLOGO MODEL 
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APPENDIX D: SNAPSHOT OF THE NETLOGO MODEL 
 
 
 
